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Joe Kulakowski leans forward across a desk that would need a major cleaning just to qualify as cluttered and succinctly states what has become so obvious to him as he’s relentlessly pursued former Circuit Court Judge Herman Thomas for the better part of the past two years.
“This is the biggest scandal in the history of American jurisprudence. In the history of American jurisprudence there has never been abuse to this extent by a judge in power involving paddling and forced sex,” Kulakowski says. “There’s nothing like this in the history of the American court system that even approaches dimensions of the corruption in this case.”
For the past two years, Kulakowski has been at the front of an effort to get to the bottom of the activities that drove Thomas from the bench in 2007. By now allegations the judge paddled inmates in a secret room he’d set up in the Mobile County Courthouse are common knowledge, and most folks have heard whispers that there may have been sexual liaisons with prisoners. But what Kulakowski claims to have discovered over the past couple of years reaches far beyond sexual perversion into the realms of massive abuse of judicial power and on to the dark and dangerous world of narcotics trafficking and police corruption.
He also claims his investigation repeatedly bumped against the political power that helped set Thomas up as one of Mobile’s “movers and shakers” — a power structure he feels seems determined to keep the former judge out of jail.
In researching this story, Lagniappe spoke to law enforcement and court officials who are aware of Kulakowski’s investigation and who, speaking upon condition of anonymity, offered their appraisal that he has indeed been able to make breakthroughs in the investigation of Thomas’ case. It is also important to point out that while Kulakowski spoke on the record about this work, he has been in constant contact with law enforcement and court officials who have been instrumental in helping move the investigation forward.
Crusading
Kulakowski has been practicing law since 1973, starting out as an assistant district attorney under Randy Butler and Charlie Graddick after clerking for U.S. District Court Judge J. Foy Guin and has been in private practice since 1975. Born in Bayou La Batre, he went to Theodore High School, Spring Hill College and the University of Alabama Law School. During the Vietnam War, he was a merchant marine and made two trips to Vietnam.
On one trip to Vietnam Kulakowski demonstrated a bit of the leap-first-look-later attitude that would come into play as he delved into Herman Thomas. The crew got an “all hands on deck” call about a pilot who had been shot down and stranded in the water for 24 hours. When they spotted him, Kulakowski jumped overboard to get him.
“Not having any sense, I just went in there and got the guy. I mean we had life jackets on and it was kind of calm, so it wasn’t so bad,” he said.
Still, he received “some kind of award,” which he said he didn’t want and seems to brush off in an embarrassed way.
Kulakowski says he’s known Herman Thomas since Thomas was in the district attorney’s office in the late ‘80s, through his time on the bench, both as a district and circuit court judge. Thomas was first appointed to the District Court bench in 1990.
“I’ve always liked him. He’s always been very gracious to me,” Kulakowski said.
He said the first indications that something was amiss concerning Thomas came when the judge tried to secure special treatment for his distant cousin and fraternity brother David Thomas when the former school board member was to serve seven days in jail for running over a child’s foot and leaving the scene on Mardi Gras Day 2005. Both Thomases are members of the Kappa Alpha Psi fraternity located at the corner of Dearborn and St. Louis Streets in downtown Mobile, and Herman Thomas is listed on a national Web site as the Polemarch or leader of that particular chapter.
Kulakowski said Herman Thomas’ actions in that matter — going out of his way to ensure that David Thomas could spend his jail time at the nearly empty Prichard Jail and essentially undermining the orders of fellow Circuit Judge Rusty Johnston — opened his eyes somewhat to the judge’s behavior. Still, it would take a strange nexus of criminal defense cases to put Kulakowski a path of personally investigating Herman Young Thomas’ actions on the bench.
Spanking Judge
Although it would take another five years for allegations to surface publicly that Herman Thomas was possibly involved in paddling prisoners, and even longer for charges to arise that he might have been trading sex for sentences, Michael Dewayne Anderson made those very charges in a civil suit filed in 2002. The suit, filed in Mobile County Circuit Court, alleged that Thomas threatened to make life more difficult for Anderson if he did not become involved in a homosexual relationship with the judge.
“I was released in 1994 from prison, and did contact Thomas but his help was to get involved in a homosexual act with him. When I refused Judge Thomas’ offer of being involved in a homosexual relationship, he advised me that if trouble came he could help, but if I refused him, he could make it hard for me and Judge Thomas has made it hard from the District Court to the Circuit Court, and Mobile County Circuit Court has been advised of his action and has done nothing to correct it,” Anderson, who is currently serving a murder sentence at Atmore, wrote in his suit.
He claimed to have sent the complaint to, among others, the Alabama Ethics Commission and the Judicial Inquiry Commission. Included in Anderson’s complaint were also sworn statements from other inmates who claimed to have had dealings with Thomas.
One of the affidavits in support of Anderson’s suit was from John Richardson who said Thomas did favors for drug dealers in return for sexual favors and he named two dealers who he claimed Thomas would pick up routinely. Richardson said one of them bragged he would always get out of trouble as long as he “plays the sex game” with Thomas.
Despite such allegations, Anderson’s suit was dismissed by former Mobile Circuit Judge Robert Kendall and was completely ignored within the state and local legal establishment.
But as Kulakowski began assisting a colleague on the defense for a man named Raydale “Pokey” Shavers in spring 2007, he still knew nothing of Anderson’s explosive claims five years earlier. By this time Thomas’ name was in the news for something other than the glowing articles and endorsements in the Press-Register that had helped his rise to prominence. Over the past year he had been front-page news for helping David Thomas find a cushier place to spend his seven-day sentence for felony leaving the scene of an accident.
Eventually Herman Thomas called for the Alabama Judicial Inquiries Commission to investigate his own actions, and they ended up suspending him in March 2007 for willfully failing to uphold the integrity of his job. Thomas then was facing a possible trial on 15 charges of violating the state’s canons of judicial ethics.
But Kulakowski was intrigued at that time with defending Shavers, who was accused of assault in the first degree for shooting Akil Figures, the son of state Sen. Vivian Figures, a close friend of Herman Thomas’. He figured JIC would do its job concerning Thomas.
The shooting involved an argument over Akil Figures’ former girlfriend Harriet Womack, who was then involved with Shavers. Figures had been in jail, but Kulakowski says Thomas got him out “as a Mother’s Day present for Vivian” and Akil had used the occasion to get into an altercation with Womack and Shavers, getting shot in the process. At some point in putting together Shavers’ defense, Kulakowski called Womack in to his office and began asking about what Figures had told her about his relationship with Judge Thomas.
“In my conversation with Harriet Womack I asked her various things about Akil because I was about to try that shooting case, and she tells me what Akil told her about being paddled by Thomas. She says Akil showed her the marks on his behind,” Kulakowski said.
This got him thinking about Akil Figures’ close relationship with Thomas and lead Kulakowski to speak with another of his clients who had a close relationship with the judge, a murder defendant named Darius Lane. When Kulakowski began telling Lane he’d heard Thomas had paddled Figures, he says Lane leaned back and said, “He whooped me too.”
“He basically said he had to take a paddling with his pants down, get his dreads (hair) cut and go to Bishop State. Which at the time I didn’t think was that bad a deal,” Kulakowski said. “And I argued that in defense of Thomas, to some extent. But in terms of judicial conduct that seemed very odd.”
Kulakowski says he told Mobile County District Attorney John Tyson and Assistant District Attorney Nikki Patterson about Womack’s contention that Thomas had spanked Akil Figures and about Lane’s accusations that he too had been paddled. He said they were initially very interested in the paddling allegations and Patterson was assigned to investigate it.
Kulakowski said Thomas’ suspension and the discovery that he had routinely removed cases from other judges’ dockets and changed sentences for certain defendants kept him fairly confident JIC would remove Thomas from office. However, Kulakowski says the DA’s office began to take a different tack around that time and it concerned him.
“What changed things? The relationship with Nikki Patterson changed when I first told her about the sexual allegations. All of a sudden she wouldn’t talk to me any more. I had to talk to her assistants or other people and she wouldn’t see me,” he said. “I sensed something personal.”
Kulakowski said by the summer of 2007 there was a “deep fear” among many local judges that JIC was going to return Thomas to the bench with just a prolonged suspension. At that point he said he was contacted by a “pretty powerful individual” and instructed that he would have to be the one to make things happen in the investigation because the DA’s office was not going to do so.
“That same day I determined that a polygraph as to the allegations of the paddling of Darius Lane would be the way to handle it to see if he was going to be able to run a good chart. So I polygraphed him on July 26th and he ran a good chart,” he said.
During the polygraph, another client came to see Kulakowski and when Lane saw the other client after the test, they high-fived one another. So Kulakowski asked him what he knew about Thomas and the second client said the judge was gay. When Kulakowski challenged him on his story, the client told him about another inmate who had confided that Thomas had sexually abused him for years. Kulakowski’s client agreed to try to set up a meeting between the two. As it turned out, Kulakowski already represented the man.
“He proceeded to tell me about being sexually abused by Herman since he was 17. At that point right there at the jail I started uncovering a large number of victims. And all of their claims were found to be credible. The numbers were staggering. People had either been paddled or whipped with a belt. In three or four places, one was in his chambers, other was the little room and some occurred at the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity where Herman is the Polemarch,” Kulakowski said.
Kulakowski stresses that it is important to understand prisoners didn’t simply line up and start claiming sexual abuse by the judge. Often he would have to meet with an alleged victim several times before the man would tell of having done something sexual with Thomas. Kulakowski also points out that not all prisoners who claim to have been paddled also claim to have been sexually abused.
“Often it would take several interviews before they would admit to the sexual abuse,” he said.
From that point on, he says, he became “obsessive compulsive” in collecting the stories of these young men claiming to have been sexually abused by Judge Thomas — stories that often included tales of Thomas threatening stronger sentences to those who refused him, or sending reluctant lovers off to prison for periods of time and then bringing them back to see if time behind bars had softened their resolve against his advances. The statements were often shocking.
For example, there was the statement of Bobby Crook, who danced dressed as a woman at the gay bar Troopers on weekends. Crook said he knew Thomas casually because of his work for a bail bonding company during the day. One night as he came out of Troopers dressed in drag, he said, Thomas drove by and slowed his car and waved. Crook said the judge pulled over and the men started talking and exchanged numbers, with Thomas telling Crook the two might become “good friends.”
Crook said he later went out on the Causeway to eat with Thomas and later the judge asked him for sex, but Crook demurred. He claimed Thomas indicated there might be a time later when Crook would want his help and might change his mind, saying “maybe one day.” Crook said sometime later his cousin was jailed on what he believed to be false charges and he called Thomas, and Thomas told him “you can make it go away. You know what to do.” Crook took that to mean having sex with the judge would free his cousin, but he refused, and Thomas sent his cousin to jail.
“I feel like he would have threw the case out, found him not guilty, let him out, if I would have had sex with him. Now my cousin is in prison for 25 or 21 years or more for something he didn’t commit because I didn’t have sex with Thomas,” Crook said.
Another young man, who was on probation and had been required to get a GED by Thomas, said the judge began calling him to come visit him on Sundays. He told how Thomas would make him pull his pants down and would swat him with the paddle with his right hand while masturbating with the other. The young man also claimed Thomas required him to meet out in west Mobile and performed oral sex on the young man while the judge masturbated.
As he collected such information, Kulakowski continued trying to get local, state and federal law enforcement officials interested in taking action, but little seemed to be happening. “The DA’s office stopped investigating at some point, then it seemed like they would pick it back up when it got so inflammatory they couldn’t avoid it,” he said.
He said the JIC investigators also asked him to help them out with their investigation and he aided them as well. Originally Attorney General Troy King’s office was tasked with investigating the matter, but there had been a falling out with JIC and a special investigator was appointed. They set up shop in District Attorney Tyson’s office.
One of Kulakowski’s early interviews led to the discovery of Thomas’ now-famous “little room,” a small converted closet space on the eighth floor of the courthouse where the judge had ostensibly set up a place where he could read and tutor students. He had apparently asked a former presiding Circuit Judge Kendall for the space, but none of his current colleagues knew he had it.
“One of the people that was interviewed right away was Douglas Hill. He actually drew me a diagram to where the little room was. There was another individual that told me about being called by Judge Thomas on a Sunday and told me how he came up the stairs to a little room with no windows and told to pull his pants down. He was paddled while Thomas masturbated himself,” Kulakowski said. “He was told to keep his mouth shut.”
Kulakowski said that particular victim had told him he entered Government Plaza on a Sunday when all the doors were locked through a side door that didn’t close properly. The man claimed Thomas told him the door would be slightly ajar and that it would allow him entrance even though the rest of the building was locked down. Kulakowski said when he went to examine the door, it was indeed damaged and wouldn’t lock even though it might look closed from the outside.
This eventually led Kulakowski and some of the other judges to take a look inside Thomas’ “little room.” The room was described to have been decorated to look like an office, but there were things that didn’t seem to fit that mold. For instance, there were no pens and there was an adding machine that had no paper in it. On the wall was a large, framed photo of a former courthouse employee who had died, and in the portrait the man was making the sign of Thomas’ Kappa Alpha Psi fraternity.
Kulakowski said after seeing the room and hearing so many stories from inmates claiming sexual encounters in Thomas’ secret chambers, it made tremendous sense to him that the room should be sprayed with fluorenol, which detects the presence of seminal fluid. However, he says when he approached Patterson about doing so, she balked, saying it wouldn’t prove anything and that Thomas could have been having sex with his wife in the room.
“They didn’t want to do it,” he said, adding that months later he happened to walk by and saw forensic investigators were in fact using fluorenol in the room and took a couple of samples of carpet.
Kulakowski says he was dismayed by the lack of cooperation and interest he was getting from the DA’s office. He was particularly troubled by an order he says Patterson gave that none of Thomas’ victims would receive any consideration in their cases, despite potential mistreatment by a sitting circuit judge.
“Word came down from Nikki Patterson that none of these victims were going to be given consideration, and this is despite the fact that Mr. Tyson had said all these cases were going to be reviewed. But I was told by Ashley Rich and Theresa Heinz that these victims were not to be given any kind of consideration by order of Nikki Patterson,” Kulakowski said. “That was extremely disappointing, so I had to accomplish what I wanted to accomplish getting around what she was trying to do.”
Kulakowski said it was his understanding that the alleged victims’ cases would be reviewed because of the allegations Thomas was sending people off to prison and bringing them back for sex, or also keeping people on probation for years and years, times that far exceeded allowable sentences for certain crimes. Keeping these men on probation gave Thomas power over them for even longer time frames, he said.
“They were excessive times that exceeded the court’s ability to have people on probation,” Kulakowski said.
‘You owe me one’
As Kulakowski continued interviewing potential victims, the stories became stranger and stranger. He also says he continued sending taped interviews and information to federal investigators, but arrest and indictment never came despite a seemingly endless river of men willing to testify about paddlings, spankings, sex and threats.
As Kulakowski interviewed more young men, he learned more about Thomas’ reputation in the community.
“One of the things that impressed me most was the black defendants would simply tell me white folks are just learning about this and they’ve known about it for years. I found it somewhat shocking that there were people who know about it and didn’t do anything about it,” he said. “But bear in mind, these young men are, for the most part, from dysfunctional families. They didn’t have the collateral support to bankroll their challenges to these things. They were just worried about going to jail.”
Another of Thomas’ alleged habits Kulakowski learned about was his propensity for checking out inmates from the Mobile County Metro Jail at all hours of the night. He would take them to his chambers and his home at all hours of the night.
Thomas also had involved local school leaders in his monitoring of certain young men, Kulakowski said. If certain young men didn’t show up in school, for instance, the principal had instructions to call Thomas. “Of course that would be another invitation for him to tell them ‘You know what time it is. You owe me one,’” Kulakowski said.
Kulakowski also began to develop a profile of the young men who claimed Thomas preyed upon them. Generally they were from about 17 to 25, he said of the alleged victims. However, at least one may have been younger than that. According to several men Kulakowski interviewed, Thomas had sexual contact with a then 15-year-old boy on a trip to Atlanta. The judge had taken several boys there to see an Atlanta Braves game.
According to the statements given, Thomas brought the boys one at a time into his room and attempted to teach them about oral sex. Eventually he brought the 15-year-old in.
“From my understanding he was sodomized anally,” Kulakowski said. “That’s from the others who were consoling him because he came back in the room crying and the others were consoling him. Others had refused that act.”
That alleged victim was later shot and killed in an unrelated crime. Lagniappe has chosen to withhold the victim’s name out of respect for his family.
Mr. Fix it
As if it weren’t already heavy enough for a circuit judge to possibly have engaged in such gross sexual and sentencing misconduct, Kulakowski was about to be confronted with perhaps the heaviest claims against Thomas — drug trafficking. As he dug deeper into Thomas’ secret life, he says more and more people began making statements about the judge’s alleged involvement in drug use and distribution. It had Kulakowski’s head swimming.
“At some point I started getting information about Thomas being involved in drugs and distribution of drugs. And there were a number of those cases that concerned me. They involved corruption in the police departments and were highly disturbing,” he said.
For Kulakowski and other courthouse officials such allegations seemed to make sense and fit the pattern of defendants he was secretly moving from other judges’ dockets to his own, or those convicts whose sentences he went back and reduced. Very often they were on drug offenses. Lagniappe was able to obtain a list of 356 cases Thomas transferred from other judges’ dockets, although the list does not specify the criminal charge in each case.
Also, Thomas’ own lifestyle was suspect to many. He owned 13 cars, which seemed excessive for someone on a judge’s salary of $147,208. Records from 2007 show Thomas’ name on makes and models as varied as a 1999 Dodge Intrepid, a 2004 Cadillac Escalade and a 1998 Lexus. Law enforcement officials speaking on condition of anonymity also said it was not uncommon for officers working road blocks to run across people with criminal records driving cars registered to the judge. When they called about it, they were always told everything was OK.
Those same law enforcement officials also say it was not uncommon for Thomas to show up at crime scenes or at hospitals and to tell criminal suspects not to speak to police.
“At some point I started to hear stories of his distribution of drugs, and these were first-hand witnesses,” Kulakowski said.
Brandon Carr, who is currently sitting in Mobile County Metro Jail on robbery charges, and who knew Thomas from the time he was 16, told Kulakowski about how Thomas’ nephew who worked at a cell phone store in the mall was able to get “burnout” chips that would allow dealers to make unlimited calls without getting a bill or leaving a record of calls, making it extremely difficult follow a trail. He also explained how Thomas would supply him and others with powdered cocaine for sale, giving dealers roughly $1,200 worth of coke to sell and expecting about $300 back for himself. Carr blamed Thomas for getting him into the drug trade.
“I sold drugs for Judge Thomas back in 2004, 2005 and part of 2006,” Carr said.
Carr also detailed how the drugs were sold in various parts of the city and the expected take from each area. Carr was a member of the Kappa League, a junior member of the Kappa Alpha Psi fraternity. He recalled a time when he claims to have showed up at the Kappa Alpha Psi fraternity house and saw Thomas, along with several Mobile Police Officers — including a high-ranking officer, a member of the District Attorney’s Office, as well as at least one high-ranking city official, with “a bunch of money on the table, just stacks of money — maybe two-three-hundred thousand dollars.” He claims Thomas later asked him what he saw and he denied seeing anything.
Carr claimed he would often meet Thomas at Gone Fishin’ restaurant or at a barber shop to give him money from dealing. He also said Thomas and the rest of the drug ring would meet routinely to discuss in which areas of town drugs were moving best and where things might need to be moved to avoid detection. Carr also said Thomas could simply make problems go away for those who worked for him.
“And if you picked up a case it ain’t going to hang over your head because he feels like he has the power because he a judge. Ain’t nobody going to mess with him. His rank just overrides a lot and he’s got connections,” Carr said. “Of course I played a part in it, but I wasn’t losing at it. That’s why I never caught a drug case.”
Kulakowski said that despite sending the District Attorney’s office Carr’s statements and personally speaking with Tyson about Carr’s statements, no one from the DA’s office has ever interviewed Carr concerning his claims about Thomas.
Why so long?
As Kulakowski has been privately investigating Thomas’ actions for nearly three years now, and it has been nearly a year and a half since the judge resigned from office, frustration mounts that indictments have not been forthcoming from either John Tyson’s office or from the federal officials Kulakowski insists are still actively engaged in an investigation. He says he has turned over to law enforcement officials almost all of the taped statements he has gathered, statements that spell out in dizzying detail Thomas’ alleged sexual appetites and staggering misuses of judicial authority. There are also the statements that detail allegations of drug use, distribution and trafficking, as well as the use of judicial powers to protect a ring of drug dealers and crooked law enforcement officials. Still, no indictments.
“I have given not only statements but access to investigators to talk to these people,” Kulakowski said.
He is particularly vexed by the knowledge that every day potential crimes could be slipping away because of the statute of limitation, which for most crimes is three years. In other words, Kulakowski fears delays by prosecutors may severely limit their pool of crimes and witnesses if they ever do indict Thomas. Assault cases, he pointed out, have a limitation of only two years, meaning many of those could not be pursued.
He points out that Section 14-11-31 of the State Code makes it unlawful for “any employee to engage in sexual conduct with a person who is in the custody of the Department of Correction, the Department of Youth Services, a sheriff, a county, or a municipality” and that doing so is a Class C felony in Alabama. This, he says, is certainly grounds for Tyson’s office to have attempted to secure an indictment of Thomas long ago.
Over time he says he even tried applying pressure to prosecutors by giving information on what he’d found to local mainstream media outlets, but that too seemed to be a dead end. Kulakowski says he brought Mobile Press-Register editor Mike Marshall to his office and played tapes of some of the statements from those alleging Thomas had demanded sex from them.
“I tried to talk to Mike Marshall at the Press-Register and he showed little or no interest — certainly not the interest I would expect for what I delivered to him. I delivered to him several tapes of victims and was going to deliver them three statements a week, but they didn’t show the interest I thought they should,” Kulakowski said.
He also said JIC never seemed particularly interested in getting to the bottom of things involving the sexual allegations about Thomas and was instead simply willing to just let things go.
“The JIC people didn’t want to hear about the paddling. They didn’t want to hear about the sex. I guess they had instructions about what they were supposed to investigate, but they got so inextricably intertwined that there was no way to talk about the ex parte contact without talking about the paddling without talking about the sex acts,” Kulakowski said.
Peggy Groves, assistant director of JIC, said that regardless of what Thomas or any other judge may have done, once he resigned JIC no longer has any authority to continue the investigation. So while JIC was presented with a signed affidavit by fellow Circuit Court Judge Joseph “Rusty” Johnston informing JIC of the sexual allegations against Thomas, once he resigned the investigation simply ended.
Now Kulakowski fears that as the case drags on, politics will again intervene on Thomas’ behalf. Assistant U.S. Attorney Vicki Davis is considered to be one of Thomas’ close friends, and she is also considered the odds-on favorite to be named the new U.S. Attorney for the Mobile District, a situation Kulakowski believes could favor the former judge, who at one time even managed a campaign for Davis when she ran for judge.
“Vicki Davis, who is up for U.S. Attorney, please understand that Herman Thomas was her political godfather. He was her campaign manager, and I’m deeply concerned if she’s confirmed as U.S. Attorney this investigation will go nowhere, because this thing is a lot bigger than Herman Thomas — much, much bigger than Herman Thomas,” Kulakowski said.
A call to Davis’ office seeking comment on this story was unreturned.
Meanwhile, Thomas has taken a position with the Brandyburg Law Firm and, among other things, has tried several cases at Strickland Youth Center. Youth Court Judge Edmond Naman verified that Thomas has appeared three or four times in his courtroom, but only as a privately paid attorney. Naman stressed that Thomas has not been appointed to do Youth Court work.
Thomas did not return a call for comments on this story before deadline.
Kulakowski believes Thomas represents the centerpiece of a much larger criminal enterprise that has worked its way into many facets of Mobile life.
“There’s so much he had his fingers into and that he controlled. He was the Mr. Fix It, the Godfather of the Black community,” Kulakowski said. “I think he’s inextricably intertwined with a great deal of corruption in this county. If the authorities do what they should do, there’s going to be a large number of people who should be concerned for their status in life. If Herman Thomas will roll if he’s ever brought to justice, there’s going to be bodies all over the streets of Mobile.”
Kulakowski, who has funded most of this investigation personally and eschewed filing a civil suit just so the case would remain “pure,” leans back and almost allows himself to smile as he thinks about his quest coming to an end if and when Thomas is indicted.
“It’s time for the people who have been associated with Herman to get on the train because it’s leaving,” he says leaning forward. “The ones who cut the deals first are the ones who get the best deals.”
bluedotbama says:
March 24, 2009
09:19 AM
I don't mind an informative discussion of the pros and cons of the article but diogenes' bias against law enforcement and name calling of me illustrates an inability to grasp reality and marginal thinking. If the best I could do is criticize and name call perhaps the name should be narcissus.
mobeeleel says:
March 21, 2009
12:15 AM
Ouch! You're a little hot under the collar diogenes, but I think your sentiment is exactly correct. Bluedot and others around town who just wish this would quietly go away and leave the status quo untouched are dreaming. The quo ain't going to be status no more when it's done is my bet. This mess has been going on for three years -- actually about seven if you count the Anderson complaint that was summarily tossed without so much as a sniff by an uninterested judiciary. This mess has gone on long enough. Without Kulakowski's tenacity there's almost no doubt Tyson, Graddick and myriad others would just let it slide.
It doesn't take three years to get an indictment. All of us here have been around the block enough to know that's an excuse. Only slow-footed feds take that long. A district attorney who means business can get it done. Tyson has run his mouth enough around the courthouse about not wanting to prosecute this thing and people talk, you know. Furman unloaded on his ass because it was the right thing to do and he helped get the ball rolling. Kulakowski drove it right down the field. Big John was in the concession stand trying to buy some popcorn the whole time.
Blue, you can defend him all you want, but the whole town knows he wasn't doing anything until this article came out and I'm sure you probably know it better than the rest of us if my guess is correct.
If you're worried someone other than Big John is going to get credit when Thomas is indicted, you can stop worrying. They will. That ship has sailed.
diogenes says:
March 19, 2009
07:15 PM
Having just discovered this article online and reading the comments, me thinks Bluedumdum has some undisclosed agenda with his bully pulpit defense of Tyson's and Patterson's inaction. The judges and law enforcement are well aware that Tyson is: (a) not very bright; (b) not a trial lawyer; (c) lazy; and is (d) a camera-seeking, washed-up windbag politician. It is obvious to all but those blind, deaf, and very dumb that bluedimwit is carrying water on this site to defame Mr. K who, for all that appears, was asked, was expected to do, and apparently, has accomplished what Tyson and Patterson didn't have the stomach to do, as was described by John Furman who should know. If Mr. K did not persist in seeking the truth about Thomas, Thomas would still be in complete control over his victims. Where was Bluedonothing? Was he uncaring about this travesty of justice, was he a coward, or was he getting such favorable treatment from Thomas, Tyson, and Patterson that his spineless conscience was massaged by his "$green poultice$" relationships with those who should have been doing what Mr. K accomplished. His quote "So who appointed Mr. Kulakowski this godsend to the investigation of Mr. Thomas?" smacks of the jealousy of a Monday morning coward who hates to see a good man do a thankless effort for no other reason than to try to right a wrong. I'm sure Bluedot and his cronies cannot understand why the good samaritan would bother with a weak and abused individual who was, in their opinion, of no consequence. The greatest evil is when good men do nothing to stop it. Bluedumdum's slander of Mr. K as self promotion belies the fact that the JIC investigators sought his (Mr. K's) help. It speaks volumes that the investigators didn't need the Bluedoofus and his sarcasm. Have the federal or state investigators sought Mr. K's assistance? (The answer is a resounding "YES.") Bluedot says he is suspicious of Mr. K's motives but is Bluedoodoo suspicious of Thomas's motives or the motives for Tyson's and Patterson's inaction. Here is my prediction - Tyson, since Holbert's articles, will crank up a facade investigation and an indictment to cover his ass and claim it was all his efforts. You can count on a press conference. The courthouse and the public will know different. Thank you Lagniappe for being real journalists of the calibre that the founding fathers' intended when they carefully framed the 1'st Amendment. When Bluedolt sees yellow journalism it is because he only sees through his yellow eyes.
bluedotbama says:
March 12, 2009
09:31 PM
ha-ha
Between me, jm & maggie we have at least educated Rob on the virtues of rock and roll. I heard today....."rock and roll can change the world"....Bono.
jm says:
March 12, 2009
08:04 PM
Bravo! If Signora Grassa should happen to perform a duet with Signor Spankeroni, tell her to avoid direct eye contact at all costs, and heed the Stones’ timeless warning… “Have some courtesy, have some sympathy, and some taste. Use all your well-learned politesse”... lest her soul be laid to waste.
Or, she can just sit on him.
Whatever you think of Rob’s article, I expect his music review to be his finest work yet.
bluedotbama says:
March 12, 2009
05:08 PM
Thank you.
My rumor mill suggests that nothing is just getting underway and musically speaking the fat lady is about to sing a loud aria.
And I still don't like the article......lol.
jm says:
March 12, 2009
02:39 PM
Doh! Knee-capped. I am in no position to argue with that song.
bluedotbama says:
March 12, 2009
01:26 PM
Your comments are appropriate and well taken. I wish I could say I was some form of cop or prosecutor but I am not otherwise I would be singing....."have a little faith in me.......", John Hiatt.
jm says:
March 12, 2009
12:24 PM
Yeah, you nailed me on the TV-PhD in Criminology. I follow what you’re saying about it being a complicated and lengthy investigation, but you’re talking like it’s just getting started. We’re adding two years to a bunch more years before that. Is it just getting started? Is that what this is about?
Either way, it does sound like an awful lot of work to be done. And thank you for using the expression “victims” this time. That’s much better. Maybe Tyson or Nicki Patterson should be giving a slightly more thorough statement to Rob instead of treating him like his coverage is “irrelevant.” That might help with the conspiracy theories.
It seems like there wouldn’t be a local trial anyway, just from the fact that he was a practicing local judge. How could he ever get a fair trial in the system he allegedly abused? I don’t really know though. They never take things that far on COPS.
I appreciate your point about the time it takes for the “process,” and nobody wants to see the job get botched. But keep this in mind: Lam Luong is not cruising through town in a Lexus with a big smirk on his face. I don’t have to ride in an elevator with him at the courthouse. More importantly, Lam Luong is not running a bridgetop child mentoring program while awaiting trial. Know what I mean?
It sounds like Thomas is a bully of the worst kind. We don’t take too kindly to bullies around here. We want to hear him on the phone singing “Renegade” to his mama. I know you can feel me on that one, B-dot.
bluedotbama says:
March 12, 2009
08:39 AM
You are right but as I said before I know that they are not going out on a limb to reassure us in the manner some are expecting. From their opinion and position, it potentially jeopardizes both the investigation and the fairness of future trial. How many times have you seen gag orders entered in cases where the parties went over the top with pretrial publicity, etc. The state and feds are avoiding it I assure you. As for time and delay, look at the case in the headlines today, Lam Luong. What an easy and straight forward case. A guy throws his 4 kids off a bridge, they die, he confesses and its been a year. The Thomas affair covers probably a stretch of 10 years, involves perhaps over 400 individuals directly and no telling how many indirectly and then you have all the related court and jail folk in the docket room that may possess information, etc. and the list goes on. So if law enforcement interview 1 of the "victims" each day its going to be over a year just to do basic interviews and render it to a report. This is a very complicated mess and I prefer they take their time and get it right rather than bend to public or political pressure to expedite the matter for their own political gain. This isn't The Practice where someone is arrested for murder one week and in trial the next. Its too bad most folk's view of how the law works is from TV. What sorta astounded me about the article is the repeated suggestion that nobody is investigating the matter when I have always heard both agencies are aggressively investigating and always have been. That includes John Tyson Jr. who by the way just got his budget cut by over $200,000. Any politics there? Is he proscecuting too many politicians? As for Nicki Patterson, I am still a little pissed by the suggestion she is somewhat behind the unsubstantiated cover up. She did an excellent job prosecuting personally Jack Tillman you know.
jm says:
March 11, 2009
10:16 PM
What then? Don’t stop short, Bluedot. What’s really going on? If there’s no big conspiracy to unravel, and I hope there’s not, then the lengthy investigation makes even less sense. It’s getting too troubling to expect the public to not be grumbling without some reassurance and affirmative acknowledgement of responsibility from law enforcement. From anybody really.
The reasonable first response to this story for any non-cynic is probably to assume that “somebody” is taking care of it. We’ve both established that this is a dangerous attitude. The questions really started burning for me when Rob started pointing out a while back that, gee, it sure is starting to take a while. From his coverage, it seems like his agenda has always been to uncover the truth, whatever that ends up being.
As for the Bar, there are a lot of attorneys who are far-removed from that sector of the legal community who have no idea what is going on. It makes no sense. If there is evidence to support these allegations, and you don’t seem to be necessarily disputing that, there are questions about why he is still practicing law if no one is protecting him. Bar complaints have been filed long ago, but the whole process is private. Call them yourself and ask them what’s being done and see where you get.
There’s so reassurance coming from anywhere. I do hope two years will prove you right. But you and I can both be right at the same time. Nobody wants to see two years’ worth of new victims added to the list. Isn’t there some kind of better balance between protecting an investigation and addressing the public’s concerns?
bluedotbama says:
March 11, 2009
05:19 PM
And that would be the same Troy King being investigated himself.
bluedotbama says:
March 11, 2009
03:17 PM
Y'all are all too cynical and pleez........ask Troy King to get involved! The last thing we need is that nut screwing up what Kulakowski has not already screwed up. He is too busy chasing dildo sellers. Pretty low attacking Nicki Patterson's kid. That came out of left field and I would hate to know my children might be subject to ridicule because of my professional position. And as I said before assume we are 2 years down the road, I expect all of you to give a collective .....you were right all along Bluedot......!!
Don't be fooled by Mr. Kulakowski's silly little escapade trying to convince everyone there is this bizarare conspiracy because there is still no right/left wing, bar association, law enforcement conspiracy. Just wait and see.
jm says:
March 11, 2009
01:22 PM
Maggie: Thanks for the nice words. This has been a fascinating discussion, although I suddenly feel like the city is crawling with cockroaches. Regarding Chris Rea, “On the Beach” is a quite groovy song. You might be right- a deserted island with a music player is really as good as it gets.
gin09 says:
March 11, 2009
11:22 AM
oh- and to bluedotbama- you state Mr Kulakowski should get out of the way of the investigation...what Investigation? Do you have knowledge that Any agency is actively pursuing this? No, I am sure you don't as Mr Tyson holds that responsibility and he has chosen to let it fade away it appears...Silence is approval-no truer words spoken.
maggie says:
March 11, 2009
11:17 AM
gin interesting twist with Nikki Patterson. Just about the time you think you have heard it all.........I still want Jeff Sessions who is on the judiciary committee to go on record on this matter. He is well respected, whether you agree with all of his polotics, position statements, etc...I think this needs to go uphill a little further than Tyson and Troy. Ideally the new Attorney General would appoint an independant prosecutor to check out the whole damn mess. Then I think heads would roll.
gin09 says:
March 11, 2009
10:41 AM
This is good ole Mobile politics at its finest. Wish they would give the names of those high ranking officials in the D A's office and police department. All need to know how corrupt these people are and the fact that the whole D A's office handled this so shady- goes to figure. Don't trust any of them and you would be surprised how many cases they refuse to prosecute without eyewitnesses as he doesn't want to lose his 90 something percent conviction rate...any idiot can make up a story and repeat it so many times, they will believe it for the truth themselves-as many of their cases show. That whole office is a joke and everyone that was "discredited" in there deserved it. They should investigate that office as well and run them all off. If you have a real crime, call Troy Kings office as he loves to prosecute what Tyson and his cronies won't and usually wins. I have seen many first hand. So glad to be out of that environment-they all stink of corruption and lack of ethics. So far we know that John Tyson has not prosecuted this-that says all we need to know about him doesn't it? Oh, and about Nicki Patterson not speaking to Mr Kulakowski anymore-maybe he should investigate what happened to her son that was on Mobile's P D and was involved in some off duty weird situation then supposedly checked into a mental unit to avoid criminal charges???Did someone from that office cover any of that up? If it would have been a regular joe out there, bet they would have been prosecuted...with eyewitnesses of course...but there were so where did they go? Keep this story going til election time and refuse to vote for anyone for D A unless they promise to fire all existing employees other than clerks-ones with no legal authority that is- and start over. They could use a clean house and maybe we could start holding our heads up again as citizens again.
mickey1 says:
March 11, 2009
08:50 AM
I think this needs to go national to get attention. I got chills after reading this article. Its makes me want to forward it to Oprah or Dateline, because clearly the extent of this goes so deep that only exposing this nationally will get Mobiles attention. Expecially before Vicki Davis gets appointed. This is an insult to all communities but expecially the black community for one of its own leaders to be assaulting the people they were chosen to represent.
maggie says:
March 11, 2009
02:12 AM
Bluedot it appears we all love our Rock and Roll which is some consensus amoung us and somehow I have a gut feeling Rob does too. Appreciate your thoughts on authoritaranism. I may coming to the conclusion that none of the laws, etc...are "right", whatever that is, and are and always have been in a state of flux. The cradle of civilization ain't too damn civil now. Humans being human and the laws being subject to their whims, social mores at the time, etc...I think a cave on a deserted island may be as good as it gets. Oh with a CD player of course. lol Oh cool new article Rob just printed that Herman is barred from the courtroom of Judge Johnstone. If the bar will do nothing in this matter, perhaps other judges may see the light and enter a similer order??? Or as the presiding Circuit Court Judge, perhaps Judge Graddick might enter one that covers Herman's activity in all of the courts. Suppose there is one way to skin a cat since the bar appears to be doing nothing. Finally, bluedot, good one re REM and Michael Stipe. You do have good taste and know your music well. Hope you are resting well. Damn the insomnia.
bluedotbama says:
March 10, 2009
03:46 PM
Glad to see we know our Rock and Roll. Does Rob??...lol.
bluedotbama says:
March 10, 2009
03:40 PM
Sorry Maggie, I think I have to fall on jm's side on this one. I agree with him in his last comments. Like him I am deathly afraid of authoritarianism. Never accept without question what the government says. Silence means approval......Michael Stipe/REM.
maggie says:
March 10, 2009
01:22 PM
jm and bluedot, I am not sure which one of you I find both amusing, intelligent, thoughtful etc...Nice dialogue. jm yes the Code that origonated in the cradle of civilization, have many many points in it whereby death was an absolute.
I will say argumento, that I think the bar should be different when life and liberty are concerned. I think the state should have a higher burden of prooving guilt. On the other hand, and thank God we have three, in civil, domestic relations, ets...I think the truth should prevail particularly in juvenille and domestic relations matters where an innocent third party, more often than not, does not have a guardian ad litem
I suppose this should be put in a different section but lets fast forward. How about Chris Rea?
Oh jm, I don't know much about LE but what I know about the law I learned from old Matlock, Perry Mason episodes etc... lol
jm says:
March 10, 2009
12:30 PM
Bluedot: Everyone’s opinion is valid. After all, I seem to get my law enforcement knowledge from TV and gangster movies, which possibly explains my excessive expletives. Nothing like a little Grace Slick to bring back the love.
I don’t have any grudge or prejudice towards law enforcement, and I’m damn sure glad we have them. They absolutely deserve respect and appreciation, but I refuse to blindly trust them either. We should never put down our air guitars long enough that we forget that things don’t always work like they’re supposed to. That’s just dangerous.
Remember what the dormouse said: Feed your head.
jm says:
March 10, 2009
12:29 PM
Maggie: Yes, LA is the only state that uses this model. How do they currently treat the presumption of innocence? The “whole truth” sounds pretty good, but I’m awfully fond of the common law’s “innocent until proven guilty.” The Code originated from an authoritarian government, whereas the common law puts priority on individual liberty, even in criminal cases. I have a phobia regarding anything authoritarian.
I don’t know. I think the adversarial system works most of the time in criminal cases, particularly now that Johnnie Cochran is no longer with us. Maybe it’s because it’s all I know, but I don’t have any serious problem with it. If only you believed in miracles, Maggie, like I believe, we’d get by…. That one was from the Jefferson Starship phase.
It seems like the Babylonians had awfully strict construction codes: “If a builder builds a house for someone, and does not construct it properly, and the house which he built falls in and kills its owner, then that builder shall be put to death.”
Sure hope the construction companies drug tested their employees.
jm says:
March 10, 2009
12:27 PM
Jayfro: The immunity stuff is very scary. Fortunately, it’s not all that common to hear about judges running completely amok. But apparently, it happens…
maggie says:
March 10, 2009
11:57 AM
Damn good. Makes me want to stroll out in the pasture to see if there is anything to eat. lol j/k
maggie says:
March 10, 2009
11:18 AM
Napolonic law is not adversarial but a "search for the truth". It was and still is practiced in France and I believe the only state that practiced it was LA. Questions or interrogations can be asked both by the two attorneys as well as the judge. The guilty are less likely to "get off" pardon the pun, as creative legal tactics that are more adversarial are based on English Common Law which our system is based on and "the whole truth" may never be entered into evidence. Probably gets into evidence via fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and how the evidence was obtained etc....
Now more importantly, bluedot, glad you liked the white rabbit comment and yes we are definately dating ourselves. lol I think I will check out the Blum Man Group today. Somehow I think I will love it. Thanks for the suggestion bluedot and have a great day.
maggie
bluedotbama says:
March 10, 2009
10:45 AM
We really are dating ourselves now are we not, jm and maggie? I love the White Rabbit comment. Ever hear Blue Man Group's spin on that?
Boy are we off track now!
Not sure on Napoleonic law. I am not familiar enough with it's aspects to have an informed opinion.
maggie says:
March 09, 2009
08:01 PM
lol jm.
Gotta take my Geritol and meditate.. Bluedot I want to make sure that you know that some of my comments may be seen caustic or possibly taken that way . Your comments are thought provoking which I think Rob and this post wants. You and jm both have valid comments. I just don't want you to think your thoughts are not food for thought in my mind, not that you respond to mine and answer to me
Night folks. xoxox
jm says:
March 09, 2009
07:22 PM
World peace by way of Grace Slick. Nothing's gonna stop us now.
maggie says:
March 09, 2009
06:25 PM
I would like to know, for my own edification, what jm and bluedot or anyone else, thinks of our system of law to go out there a bit. While I do not think we need to go back to Hammurabi's Code of Laws, I do think that a search for the truth as was relatively recently practiced in Louisiana, Napolianic law, is superior to out current system based on Old English Common Law and the adversarial system. I believe this should be the case at least in Civil proceedings. Any thoughts? Bluedot, I do respect your comments regarding at what stage an investigation is underway and whether or not it can be made public. Oh by the way, you and jm have a good taste in music. I have a preditor named Alice based White Rabbit. It just seemed to fit. Damn I think I am feeling older. lol
bluedotbama says:
March 09, 2009
04:25 PM
Ah.....we both like Grace Slick, jm. Just don't recall her saying much about taking time and patience unfortunately.
jm says:
March 09, 2009
02:33 PM
bluedot: The same song, maybe, but we’re still playing in a different key. You don’t seem to understand that the growing sense of urgency is valid.
We’re talking about predatory sexual abuse involved here, not campaign funds. If my child was a victim, adult or not, I’d be screaming in the streets after a few weeks passed with no arrest. I worry that the lack of uproar has something to do with the victims being “troubled,” which is bullshit. No one deserves this kind of treatment.
If there is a good case on even one of the alleged sex offenses, I don’t see why he can’t be locked up while the bigger-picture investigation is going on. There is an element to his alleged activity that involves preying on those who are weaker. I don’t remember hearing before about him allegedly keeping people on extended probation. That’s just f’d up. Anyone who’s ever watched SVU knows that this type of sexual deviance is not about sex- it’s about power. And people who do this do not stop. He no longer has the advantage of being a judge, so now he’s forced to prey on those who are even weaker and more vulnerable. I’ll let you draw your own conclusions there.
If the man didn’t do these things, then god bless him. What a nightmare! But if he did, WHY is he still roaming the streets?
I don’t care who wins any piss contest and I don’t care about the politics. I just need to know that someone is standing up for those young men, and protecting the rest of us.
If the things Mr. K said are true, or even mostly true, then I’m glad that I had the opportunity to read about them in the Lagniappe. If nothing else, now I know to hightail it the other way should I pass Thomas at Gov’t Plaza. Maybe even run and dive behind an object. I just really think that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing this story if the song is going to go so slow.
Speed up your tempo. Don’t you remember? We built this city on rock-and-roll.
maggie says:
March 09, 2009
02:01 PM
So do any of the readers really think that Mr. Holbert wrote this article with the help and information by Mr, K and that what he and his staff write depend upon what the Mobile Register do (or don't do)? The quality of the work and different view that he and his staff offers the public would definitely decline. I don't think Mr. K nor anyone short of Guido with his knee capper could bully Rob and staff into printing or not printing a well researched story with multiple sources and even Guido would probably have a hell of a time. I have a friend who knows Rob pretty well and he has thick skin and is pretty bull headed when he sees a story that needs to be printed or to wait on it a little longer until he is able to obtain another independent source.
Bluedot, I agree with you that it did take years for Russo, et al in this city to be prosecuted and I know that the wheels of justice turn slowly. But just how slow can we get on this atrocity particularly as it pertains to the hundreds of cases transferred to Herman's docket and are now in jail, some for decades when the statute of limitations may expire? Someone needs to put a little fire under the snail ass of the investigatory agencies if indeed they are actually investigating. Maybe this story will be the cow prod that helps move things along.
jm, re Rules of Professional Conduct 8.3, I guess there are pleanty who did nothing and they will have to live with that. I have caused too much pain to some in my life to offer my opinion as to how they might come back if reincarnation exists. I do get a chuckle out of the options though.
Thanks for the advice homer and jm re font, etc...once again user error. Damn wish I could blame it on the computer..........
Hope everyone has a wonderful day.
bluedotbama says:
March 09, 2009
11:25 AM
Ms. Figures is not a lawyer and not in the running for US Attorney.
bluedotbama says:
March 09, 2009
11:19 AM
Maybe JM you are coming around. Actually I think we are on the same sheet of music just you want the music tempo much faster than me. Its too bad that law enforcement can't/wont ' give briefings as reassurance. They never do. And they certainly are not going to brief Kulakowski who apparently can't keep his mouth shut. Given the complexity and number of witnesses/victims, I am not the least concerned that no charges have been filed ......yet. How many years did the US Attorney investigate Russo before he was indicted when we all heard the rumors. It was years also. Just be patient.
jayfro says:
March 09, 2009
10:59 AM
OK...I may be a bit late to this conversation, but I'd like to make a point that I haven't seen raised yet. First, let me say I'm not a member of the bar and can't really comment on the immunity issue brought up earlier...but that scares the hell out of me and it will be something I'm going to look into later.
I think one thing that might bring national attention to this matter is the appointment of Ms. Figures to the US Attorney's office. If her connection to this story is brought up as another example of poor vetting by the Obama administration; the corruption, titillation, and personalities in this story make it good fodder for the cable news talking heads. This kind of attention might actually spur some action from the people in charge of the various investigations or at least force them to comment on why the investigations have not gone anywhere.
jm says:
March 09, 2009
10:42 AM
Ah. Everybody wants to be the one on the white horse.
I seriously hope that law enforcement really is all over this. These accusations are horrific. Once this sort of time goes by, people start getting impatient to hear what’s being done.
What’s been said can’t be unsaid. If there really is a big investigation, maybe it’s time for law enforcement to start issuing a little more reassurance. Maybe they should call Rob and give him a big exclusive on the impressive progress made on the case and where it goes from here. Then, the public’s faith in law enforcement is restored, they get to reclaim their white horse, and everybody’s happy. Ta-da.
bluedotbama says:
March 08, 2009
09:53 PM
I don't think he will get away with anything. And yes this had been going on for a while and what was in the report is nothing I have not seen in the last 2 comic cowboys parades. Kulakowski brings nothing we have not already heard in one way or another. I question his agenda and have more faith in law enforcement than y'all do apparently. I am afraid in the years to come he will try to be the one riding in on the white horse saying look what I did to save us from Herman Thomas when in reality he is an irrelevance. Can't you just see his TV ads now?
jm says:
March 08, 2009
07:16 PM
Bluedot: Sigh. I give up.
I’m just tired of seeing the years pass and wondering if Thomas is going to get away with this. It’s an outrage and an embarrassment to the legal profession. I’m not really interested in defending anyone else’s journalism or “truthiness,” but I’ll say this: You might want to read some back issues to get a better feel for the fact that the stuff from Mr. Kulakowski is a development to an ongoing story, rather than its initiation.
You know people who get their news from Stephen Colbert? The Stephen Colbert from Comedy Central? Yikes! Forget this crusade. You should go full-time working on that problem.
jm says:
March 08, 2009
07:14 PM
maggie: As you may be aware, any attorney with knowledge of misconduct has an affirmative duty to report it under the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.3. That’s a whole lot of oxen to gore right there. Every single attorney who turned their heads all the way through this mess is guilty of their own ethical violation. Tsk tsk. What would Buddha say?
bluedotbama says:
March 08, 2009
11:20 AM
I think you are confusing my criticism of Rob's article with an endorcement or support for the appearance of nothing being done or Thomas's actions. It is not. Do I hate what I see in the behavior? Yes. On the other hand my criticism is that Mr. Kulakowski sucked Rob into writing a report that masquerades as investigative journalism when its more akin to Rush Limbaugh or Stephen Colbert who's programs are entertainent and not journalism but unfortunately too many people believe their drivel as real journalism and truthful all the time. I laugh and enjoy the programs for their entertainment value but not much more. The article suggests in reality there is this vast conspiracy to protect Thomas that only Mr. Kulakowski was able to expose. Its really laughable to suggest all these law enforcement entities are in cahoots with each other even when they have vastly different agendas and none include protecting Thomas. Most if not all would love Thomas' head as a trophy. Mike Marshall figured out Kulakowski and I am concerned that Rob was not able to do so. While we are throwing around all these names in this conspiracy lets go ahead and include Phillip Garrett, chief of police, Sam Cochran, sheriff, the head of the local FBI office whoever the heck that is, Maria Murphy, the head of the criminal division of the US Attorneys office, Mike Marshall, editor of the Press Register......no wait Kulakowski already accused him, Sam Jones and Mike Dow for good measure and of course Steve Nodine because he always likes controversy anyway. I suggest you look perhaps 2 years down the road. The trials are over. The results are in. Ask then to law enforcement....was Mr. Kulakowski any help? I suggest the answer is no. Did he in ways compromise the investigation? The answer is yes. Did Rob's article encourage any investigation? The answer is that it was irrelevant.
jm says:
March 07, 2009
08:31 PM
Oh.....sorry. Yeah, what homer said.
jm says:
March 07, 2009
08:29 PM
maggie: It’s probably the government scrambling your messages to try and silence you.
Are you typing in another program and cutting and pasting your posts? Maybe the font you’re using isn’t converting to the site properly. Try Times New Roman.
homer says:
March 07, 2009
08:14 PM
<b>Maggie</b><br>
Are you typing it in another program then pasting it into the website box? If so that could be the cause or you are using some weird or really old browser.
maggie says:
March 07, 2009
05:51 PM
Crazy site. My posts are cut off, double spaced and not printed in toto. Maybe it is user error. Wish I knew so I could try to fix it. And no I will not be calling "Mr. Fixit". I don't have the sphincter for it.
maggie says:
March 07, 2009
05:46 PM
jm, I enjoy spirited debate and I appreciate your thoughts.
Bluedot, I am sorry that you conside judicial immunity boring. Perhaps you are or never will be in the position of losing your 14th Amendment rights as it appears many have due to the actions of Judge Thomas.
Tell you what Bluedot, hows about you getting about 500 calories a day in the pokey aftet appearing in the "honerable" Judge Thomas kangaroo court, starving to death, being sodomized by none other than the one who sentenced you and then come back in twenty years and tell us all what you think about the "system".
Maybe protected rights won't seem quite so boring to you. As a very knowledgable law professor told me some time ago, it all gets right down to " whose ox is being gored".
Bluedot is your Ox being gored==probably not. I think also that many many others, particularly the "white folk" who just learned of this unlike the african american community in this area Ox's are not being gored. That said, pleaseee. No one just learned of this. They just chose to turn a blind eye to it. So much for the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Act. Despite our President being half black or half white and being voted in his office, have we really made progress. All depends upon whether you decide the glass is half full or half empty I suppose but Bluedot, Herman, the Bar, the JIC to include state and federal officials, and others who could but chose not to try to stop this and not continue to protect the those who engage in corruption in our city, when you die and stand on the outside of the pearly gates, exactly how will you explain your sins of omission or commission?
The Buddist's say at the time of death only two questions. Did you have joy in your life and did you bring joy to others. Don't know if I will be over the fifty percent line but it is food for thought. Judge Thomas, did you bring joy to those you abused? I dare you to answer in your own name and agree to an interview by Rob and a lie detector test.
jm says:
March 06, 2009
08:12 PM
bluedotbama: There are numerous avenues for putting a hitch in the giddy-up of a bad judge, including criminal prosecution, pushing him out of the judge’s office (which is done), pushing him out of the practice of law, and suing the shit out of him and everybody connected to him. The discussion of judicial immunity mostly touches on the last option and is not really related to any presuppositions about the criminal aspect. But yeah, it’s boring. That is, until you start realizing how much power judges actually have. It’s frightening really, and it stresses just how crucial it is that they be trustworthy individuals.
This story has been going on for a very long time now with information from multiple sources alleging that the investigation is not being adequately investigated. Meanwhile, the statutes of limitation are running out on potential claims, the guy is still practicing law, and who knows what else. At what point is it time to stop blindly trusting that law enforcement is doing their job and start raising holy hell?
One would imagine that if some body of law enforcement was on the verge of riding in on a white horse, and Mr. K was getting in their way, they would have already contacted him, assured him of the adequacy of their investigation, and requested his cooperation and discretion. That’s what happens in the movies anyway.
As for why anyone would obsess over such a cause, well, I can give you about a hundred reasons why it’s important. But let’s just start with one: your already expressed concern over the humiliation suffered by the young men involved. I’ll spare you the psycho-babble, because it, too, is boring. But let me just say that it’s not all that surprising that some of them ended up back in a criminal defense attorney’s office. At least indirectly, that affects us all. Doesn’t that piss you off at least a little bit?
jm says:
March 06, 2009
08:07 PM
maggie: I bet the numbers are even higher than reported and I understand why. I think the Bar has become pretty sensitive to this issue, and to my knowledge has given quite a few qualified “second chances.” Of course, I think we’d all agree that Thomas is not the kind of down-on-his-luck boozer that needs any sympathy.
Back to my original point: Just trying to imagine Thomas’ defense even arguing that his sexual abuse is within the scope of his judicial function seems laughable. Make that “lewd, lascivious, salacious, outrageous!" That would be something to watch, huh?
jm says:
March 06, 2009
08:02 PM
homer: A good ole boy network relies on apathy and dismissive cynicism just as much as compliance. Even if they never disbar Mr. Thomas, the first issue is that they be asked to. Repeatedly.
bluedotbama says:
March 06, 2009
11:34 AM
All this stuff about judicial immunity......boring. It presupposes law enforcement is doing nothing for that reason apparently. Nothing suggests that. The issue seems to be that the story suggests that since law enforcement does not meet Mr. Kulakowski's rules and time tables something is wrong. He may be 100% correct in his conclusions and I suspect he is however my complaint with the article remains the same. Why do we need to rely on this individual whose obsession with Herman Thomas has led him to this point and these accusations? Unfortunately or perhaps fortunately law enforcement is not so public with their investigations as to jeopardize their cases. Would people have applauded the US attorney if she gave daily briefings to the press on the progress of the FBI's investigation of Mr. Russo. They don't do that. It is improper and can seriously injure the course of the investigation. I just think Mr. Kulakowski needs to get a life. I am concerned that he is hurting not helping law enforcement. Further is he jeopardizing the fairness of any trial when it occurs??
maggie says:
March 06, 2009
10:37 AM
It is interesting that when looking at most professions in which the possibility of malpractice might occur, the profession with the least filed and prosecuted is the legal profession. And Homer your point about what exactly it takes to have an attorney disbarred particularly considering the above reminds me of an article by Ian Gaston, president of the Mobile Bar in Mobile Bar Monthly. In the July 2007 issue Mr. Gaston wrote that lawyers as a whole are twice as likely to suffer from substance abuse, depression and alcoholism than the population at large. He went on to say that 40-50 percent of the complaints to the Bar were a factor of their mental health, i.e substance abuse, depression etc...All lawyer jokes aside, it was courageous of him to write the article. Unfortunately he went on to offer help to local attoreys with some of these problems, but sadly only about 12 or so came to the meetings that were anonymous---like AA for attorneys. Granted they may be getting help somewhere else. Or not. Who knows It is food for thought.
maggie says:
March 06, 2009
10:24 AM
jm you are correct. The duties of Herman can be separated into judicial or administrative. Of course he will argue that all were judicial. I believe the circuits are probably split on the scope of judicial immunity to some extent which would increase the possibility that the United States Supreme Court would hear the case should it not be totally resolved within the eleventh circuit. I don't know why a couple of my posts appear cut off on the right side. Probably user error. lol
homer says:
March 06, 2009
10:24 AM
The state bar association??? Are you kidding me? I've watched them ignore people nearly as reprehensible as Herman Thomas, drug charges, DUI, spousal abuse, stealing client's money, changing contracts, tax fraud, practicing out of state, extortion... they do nothing. It's got to be one of the biggest good ole boy networks in existence. I'm trying to figure out what if anything (other than turning on another lawyer) gets you disbarred.
jm says:
March 05, 2009
10:19 PM
Maggie: Sick cluster f… indeed. I'm actually posting this before reading your most recent post, so forgive me if you've addressed my points....
My assumption, perhaps incorrect, would be that some of the accused “extracurricular activities” would not constitute “judicial actions.” My hope would be not necessarily that the case would challenge Dykes, but that Dykes wouldn’t apply to some of his actions. Kind of like how it might not apply if a theoretical judge crashed into my car while coked-out and driving home from a nice off-duty catfish dinner. Done by a judge does not a judicial act make. Or does it?
I didn’t read all of your cited cases, but in the ones I’m familiar with, it seems like the judges (and those with related immunity) were immune from liability for the “judge-type things” they did (rendering orders, issuing arrest warrants, etc), even if the “judge-type things” were done with an improper or illegal manner or purpose. I’m having a hard time viewing the sex acts themselves as “judge-type things.”
Is absolutely anything a judge does to an accused while flexing his judge muscle automatically considered a judicial act? Correct me if I’m wrong in wanting to limit the scope of the term. Hmmm. Or maybe not. How will I ever sleep again?
Unfortunately, I do agree that under the prevailing case law, he’s covered by immunity for some of his clearly judicial actions, notwithstanding the egregious underlying intentions. For most of those persons acting according to the direction of Thomas, I do agree with you that immunity may be triggered. This is regretful, but I could begrudgingly follow an argument that almost anything done under the instruction of a presiding judge could potentially be considered a judicial action raising an argument for quasi-judicial immunity. Even if it’s a stretch, they were, in fact, doing their jobs. Sort of. It’s an extraordinary case, but you’re right in your assertion that judicial immunity is extraordinarily vast.
At any rate, maybe this is a good case to challenge overreaching judicial immunity. It gives me the willies.
I don’t at all think he’s protected regarding his criminal actions. If I understand correctly, there is a much higher standard including a “good faith” requirement. Now if only we could talk somebody into the pesky little task of prosecuting him.
I would definitely be interested in hearing from officials from the Bar.
gia says:
March 05, 2009
09:28 PM
We need more people like Joe K. in this Godforsaken town. More power to you, and thank you for all the work you put into this investigation. My prayers are with you that Herman Thomas fries for his crimes. What a disgusting individual this piece of trash is, he needs to be locked up and throw away the key.
maggie says:
March 05, 2009
08:49 PM
Homer and Bluedot,
I do believe that the level and scope of judicial immunity would not protect Herman from the drug dealing and other very far removed behavior from his function in a judicial capacity.
Just as Soverign Immunity has been abrogated by the United States Supreme Court in some cases, I think Mr. Kulakowski might have a really good civil RICO case and the issue of judicial immunity and scope of it would likely go up to the Supremes.
Here is what I hope. That Mr. K files a civil suit and has it moved to the Middle district of Alabama in federal court because of all of the publicity down here. I hope Herman had insurance that covered his actions as a judge and that Mr. K becomes the richest lawyer in town and also that the individuals harmed are made whole to the extent possible with counseling, monetary compensation, etc...I of course do not believe Mr. K is doing this and
Bluedot the 4 exaamples you have of investigations in the distent past, Mims, et al, and more recently are awfully few based on the history of corruption. Can you name 300 more? Mr. K has done his homework and is taking a hell of a risk--I believe he is doing this for the right reasons not money.
Fortunately, since the Booker decision in SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, UNITED STATES v. BOOKER, CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, No. 04—104.Argued October 4, 2004–Decided January 12, 2005, that speaks to minimum mandatory sentencing guidelines, the federal court system on rare occasions does allow for review of cases ex post facto. We can only hope that this would be the case for the poor individuals who are in jail due to the behavior of Herman, with the statute of limitations tolling
Oh by the way, there is such an animal as judicial malpractice insurance. They (the judges) do not like to advertize the fact. The exextance of such insurance is some proof as other posts note, that there is some limit to the scope of judicial immunity. Maybe there is a God.
Godspeed Mr. K and you also Mr. Holbert.
Copyright (c) 1990 Case Western Reserve Law Review.
Case Western Reserve University, 1990, 41 Case W. Res. 267
NOTE: Judicial Malpractice Insurance? The Judiciary Responds To The Loss of Absolute Judicial Immunity
NAME: David R. Cohen
SUMMARY:
... Virtually every practicing attorney and law professor is surprised to learn that many judges carry judicial malpractice insurance. ... After overview of the reaction of the judiciary to the decreasing scope of judicial immunity, two specified responses are explored: (1) the judiciary's attempts to restore its immunity via legislation, and (2) the judiciary's resort to judicial malpractice insurance. ... Relying on Bradley, the Supreme Court held Judge Stump immune from civil liability because he had not acted "in clear absence of" subject matter jurisdiction; rather, his order was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction which, under the Bradley formulation of judicial immunity, did not carry with it any liability. ... The immunity of judges from economic liability arising from a jurisdictionally proper judicial act was no longer absolute after Pulliam. ... Finally, "insurance coverage for liability outside the reach of judicial immunity" was suggested; coverage could include indemnification against liability for acts not protected under judicial immunity in any case. ... Summary. Dur to judicial immunity protections and voluntary or statutory state risk absorption, the risk of civil liability retained by judges is deceptively low. ... Those who argue in favor of restricting the scope of judicial immunity are likely to argue that judges themselves should pay for damage awards or for insurance against damage awards. ...
HIGHLIGHT: For several centuries judges enjoyed absolute judicial immunity. Recent years have seen a decrease in the scope of judicial immunity. The increasing success of suits against judges has caused many members of the judiciary to purchase judicial malpractice insurance. The Author questions the current cost of such insurance by examining the amount and necessity of protection it affords and the risk of civil liability not already covered by the state.
TEXT:
[*267] I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually every practicing attorney and law professor is surprised to learn that many judges carry judicial malpractice insurance. This surprise stems from the belief that judges are immune from suit: a "wrong" decision properly invites an appeal, not a lawsuit against the judge.
While it is true that no attorney will prevail against a judge for having ruled incorrectly if the judge has proper jurisdiction, lawsuits against judges for actions undertaken in their role as judges have been increasingly successful. n1 This increase results from rulings limiting the traditional scope of absolute judicial immunity. Judicial malpractice insurance to indemnify judges against liability for damages and the attorney's fees required for the defense of such lawsuits has emerged as one response to such suits.
This note begins with a general description of who is a judge, n2 why judges are immune, n3 and from what judges are immune. n4 It then traces the history of judicial immunity in the United States and defines the scope of judicial immunity as it exists [*268] today. n5 After overview of the reaction of the judiciary to the decreasing scope of judicial immunity, n6 two specified responses are explored: (1) the judiciary's attempts to restore its immunity via legislation, n7 and (2) the judiciary's resort to judicial malpractice insurance. n8
Finally, this note critically analyzes the necessity, efficiency, and public policy grounds of state payment for this coverage. n9 The note concludes that while judicial malpractice insurance serves a valid purpose, the judiciary must demand that the cost of this insurance not outweigh its benefits, and the public should question the use of tax dollars for its procurement.
II. WHO IS IMMUNE TO WHAT AND WHY?
The doctrine of judicial immunity raises three fundamental questions: Who is immune? Why is a judge immune? From what is a judge immune? These preliminary questions are answered below.
A. Who is Immune?
Determining to whom judicial immunity extends is not as straightforward as one might expect. The doctrine's applicability is not restricted to judges of general and limited jurisdiction; sheriffs, n10 prosecutors, n11 coroners, n12 court reporters, n13 clerks of court, n14 jurors, n15 grand jurors, n16 witnesses, n17 bailiffs, n18 arbitrators, n19 and [*269] other individuals who have been sued for conduct undertaken in a judicial capacity n20 have successfully invoked judicial or "quasi-judicial" immunity. This note examines the doctrine of judicial immunity only with respect to judges as that term is commonly understood. n21 However, the rationales underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity and the recent limitations that have restricted the scope of that immunity apply equally to judges and "quasi-judges" acting in a judicial capacity.
B. Why are Judges Immune?
Judicial opinions and scholarly articles advance both practical and theoretical support for judicial immunity. The reason most often emphasized is that fear of reprisal would undermine judicial independence from the interests of litigants: "[J]udges must be free to act without fear of harassment by dissatisfied litigants." n22 It is easy to see the danger that a judge presiding over a case with [*270] the knowledge that the losing party might bring a retaliatory suit, would simply rule against the party least likely to do so.
There are less obvious reasons to protect judges from civil liability. One scholar has suggested several additional justifications:
(1) The saving to the public of the drain upon judicial time that would otherwise be necessitated for the defense of private litigation; . . . [2] The fear that men of property and responsibility might otherwise be deterred from judicial service; [3] The especial importance of an independent judiciary in the American federal and state constitutional systems; [4] The need somewhere of absolute finality in the litigation of controversies . . .; [5] The existence of adequate opportunities for change of venue, new trial, or reversal on account of prejudice or error . . .; [6] The theory . . . that judges in their exercise of the judicial function are under no duty . . . to the individual litigants before them, but are rather under a duty owing only to the public collectively and sanctioned sufficiently by the criminal law and the impeachment or removal power; [7] . . . [T]he feeling . . . that it would be manifestly unfair for the law to place one in a position the very significance of which is to require his opinion and accord it especial deference in the matter in hand, and yet at the same time to penalize him with personal consequences by reference to the opinion of another or others in regard to the same matter. n23
The author added that the continuing vitality of judicial immunity might rest on another very practical, if cynical, reason: judges may simply be protecting their own interests. n24
C. Immune to What?
The bases of judicial immunity presented above are insufficient to support an absolute exemption from the imposition of civil [*271] liability or criminal culpability. For example, a judge accused of shoplifting could not plead judicial immunity as a defense n25 because the principal justification for invoking judicial immunity, fear of reprisal that would bias the judge, is lacking. Similarly, a judge found to have committed the tort of battery cannot raise judicial immunity as a defense. n26 The reasons underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity apply to immunize judges qua judges only.
Of course, certain behavior, such as issuing an opinion, is clearly "judicial," while other behavior, such as shoplifting, clearly is not. However, some behavior is more difficult to categorize -- for instance, hiring a relative as court reporter in favor of more qualified applicants. Cases discussing such behavior have defined the boundaries of judicial immunity.
D. The History of Judicial Immunity n27
1. Early Doctrine
The doctrine of judicial immunity first emerged in England in the early fourteenth century during the reign of King Edward III. n28 Not until this time "did the familiar distinction between the [*272] review of judgments and complaints against judges arise." n29 Before this distinction was recognized, "[r]eview of a court judgment was, quite simply, a personal action against the judge." n30 The doctrine of judicial immunity thus predates by nearly 400 years the other cornerstone of judicial independence, life tenure of office. n31
The United States adopted these two cornerstones of judicial independence to build a strong judicial branch of government. The Constitution grants federal judges life tenure, n32 and, in the first American cases to address the issue, judges were held immune from liability for actions authorized "by virtue of [their] judicial power." n33
2. The Supreme Court Definition of Judicial Immunity
The Supreme Court of the United States did not review the doctrine of judicial immunity until after the Civil War, n34 at which time the Court endorsed the doctrine wholeheartedly. In Randall v. Brigham, n35 a disbarred attorney brought suit alleging that the state justice who disbarred him had acted arbitrarily and without proper authority. The Court, noticing that the "doctrine [of judicial immunity] is as old as the law," n36 ruled in favor of the judge because judges "are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts [*273] . . . unless pehaps where the acts . . . are done maliciously or corruptly." n37
Three years later, the Court removed even this limitation. In Bradley v. Fisher, n38 an attorney alleged that a judge, with malicious and corrupt motivation, had blacklisted him from practicing in certain courts. n39 Although the Court agreed with the attorney that the judge had improperly blacklisted him, the Court ruled that the judge could not be held liable for damages: [J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil action for their judicial acts, even when such acts . . . are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." n40 Addressing Randall's suggestion that malicious judicial acts might carry civil liability, n41 the Bradely Court stated, "[Those] qualifying words . . . were not intended as an expression of opinion that in the cases supposed such liability would exist . . . ." n42
While the Bradley Court broadened the scope of judicial immunity on one front by immunizing judges even where their rulings were clearly based on improper motives, it adopted two rules that served to narrow the range of judicial immunity on other fronts. First, the Bradley Court drew an important distinction between judges acting "in excess of their jurisdiction" n43 and judges acting "[w]here there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . ." n44 The Court ruled that judges acting in clear absence of jurisdiction could be held liable for damages, regardless of whether their actions were malicious or corrupt. For instance, if a probate court judge tried and sentenced a party for a criminal offense, the judge could not assert judicial immunity. n45 However, [*274] if a judge in a criminal court of general jurisdiction tried and sentenced a party for conduct not proscribed by law, judicial immunity would protect the judge from personal liability. n46 Hence the Bradley Court established the parameters of judicial immunity by looking first to judicial subject matter jurisdiction. No judicial act, even a malicious one, performed within the jurisdiction of the court could form the basis of a judge's personal liability. n47 However, if the court acted without subject matter jurisdiction, an honest mistake or an otherwise valid ruling could be grounds for a lawsuit. n48
The second important limitation which the Bradley Court adopted was the restriction of judicial immunity to "judicial acts." n49 An exact definition of the term "judicial act" was not attempted by the Supreme Court until over 100 years later, n50 and this attempt received much criticism. n51 Put simply, a judicial act is one that particularly requires judicial power and discretion; it is [*275] an act that only a judge may perform. n52 The distinction is that "'judicial capacity' . . . is a narrower concept than 'official capacity,'" n53 and only those acts performed within the judicial capacity are immune from civil liability. Thus, a judge's act may be an official act yet not a judicial act.
Judicial immunity does not encompass official acts. Acts that are official but not judicial might be labelled "ministerial, administrative, executive, [or] legislative . . . ." n54 Among these official but nonjudicial acts are selecting jurors (ministerial), n55 hiring and firing employees (administrative), n56 evaluating and appointing judicial officers (executive), n57 and promulgating to the state bar a Code of Professional Responsibility (legislative). n58 These acts are [*276] all, in some sense, job-related, but they are not judicial and, therefore, are subject to liability, because none of the reasons underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity n59 apply. For instance, protecting a judges's independent discretion in hiring a court clerk is not essential to the dispensation of justice.
Actions of a judge which are neither judicial nor official are, a fortiori, beyond the scope of judicial immunity. Were it otherwise, every action of a judge would be protected from attack. Wholly unofficial conduct involving abuse of judicial power n60 or criminal behavior n61 is properly not immune from sanction. "Whether the act done by [a judge is] judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent." n62
3. The Supreme Court Creates a Caveat
The broad outlines of judicial immunity laid down in Bradley remain the basis for determining judicial liability today. Judicial acts performed with proper jurisdiction have enjoyed absolute immunity from civil liability since Bradley was decided in 1872 -- until recently. Oddly, at the moment that Bradley articulated the rules defining the scope of judicial immunity, Congress enacted seemingly unrelated civil rights legislation that would lead to the first serious erosion of those rules over 100 years later. n63
In order to implement the Civil Rights amendments, n64 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, n65 codified as 42 U.S.C. [*277] § 1983 ("section 1983"). Section 1983 imposes civil liability on "[e]very person who [under the color of state law] causes . . . [another] person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] . . . deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ." n66 At the time of the enactment, certain members of Congress recognized that application of the statute to "every person" would conflict with doctrines of immunity protecting certain government officials, but the issue was not resolved. n67
The issue of section 1983's impact on judicial immunity first arose in Pierson v. Ray. n68 Several ministers were found guilty of breach of the peace while demonstrating for racial integration in Mississippi. n69 The presiding judge, Judge Spencer, "convicted the ministers even though he had been made aware of a Supreme Court decision supporting the ministers' actions." n70 Later, in a de novo trial, the court directed a verdict of not guilty in favor of one clergyman, and charges against the others were withdrawn. The clergymen then brought suit against Judge Spencer claiming that the conviction violated their civil rights. n71 The Pierson Court found the value of judicial immunity to outweigh that of protecting a citizen's civil rights, holding that judicial immunity was not abolished by section 1983. n72 Thus, Judge Spencer's immunity was upheld even though he violated the clergymen's civil rights.
In Stump v. Sparkman n73 the Court more clearly defined the scope of judicial immunity. The mother of a slightly retarded, fifteen year old girl filed a petition requesting Judge Stump to order her daughter to undergo fallopian tubal ligation. The mother feared that her daughter, who had started to date, was unable to [*278] comprehend the possible consequences of sexual activity. n74 Judge Stump granted the petition "in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem." n75 The daughter was sterilized less than one week later in an operation which she was told was an appendectomy. n76 When the daughter, then married, discovered two years afterwards why she could not become pregnant, she brought suit against Judge Stump for violation of her civil rights. n77 Relying on Bradley, the Supreme Court held Judge Stump immune from civil liability because he had not acted "in clear absence of" subject matter jurisdiction; n78 rather, his order was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction which, under the Bradley formulation of judicial immunity, did not carry with it any liability. n79
Three justices dissented, agreeing with the majority's analysis of judicial immunity but maintaining that Judge Stump's behavior was so outrageous that it was not a judicial act. n80 The majority of the Court, however, found that Judge Stump's act was judicial and was also within his jurisdiction; in so finding, the majority "sacrifice[d] the individual to the system in no uncertain terms." n81
Given this history of strong judicial immunity, one can imagine [*279] Magistrate Pulliam's shock when, in 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that she was liable for over $ 80,000 n82 because her conduct caused private injury to a plaintiff -- even though her actions were indisputably judicial acts within her subject matter jurisdiction. n83 Magistrate Pulliam had set bail for several defendants accused of nonjailable offenses. n84 When some of the accused individuals were unable to make bail, she ordered them incarcerated. Richmond Allen, one of the jailed defendants, sued Magistrate Pulliam for violating his civil rights. Allen did not seek monetary damages; rather, he sought injunctive relief to prevent Pulliam from continuing this practice. n85 The federal district court found Pulliam's actions unconstitutional and enjoined Pulliam from engaging in such conduct. n86 In addition, the district court awarded Allen attorney's fees of $ 7,038 n87 under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. n88 Pulliam [*280] appealed the award, claiming judicial immunity. n89 The Supreme Court affirmed, despite finding that Pulliam had acted in her judicial capacity and within her subject matter jurisdiction. n90 The Court held that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not preclude injunctive relief, as opposed to money damages, against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity. n91 Moreover, judicial immunity does not preclude a statutory award of attorney's fees generated in obtaining that injunctive relief. n92
Pulliam was a 5-4 decision, and the dissent argued that the rationale for immunizing judges against civil liability for monetary damages applies equally to liability for attorney's fees. n93 Nevertheless, the majority found support for its holding in both an historical analysis of the judicial immunity doctrine and an analysis of congressional intent in enacting section 1983. n94 In so holding, the Court broke with 400 years of common-law doctrine and sent shock waves through the entire judicial community." n95 The immunity of judges from economic liability arising from a jurisdictionally proper judicial act was no longer absolute after Pulliam.
III. REACTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY TO THE LOSS OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Before the Pulliam decision, one judge and his law clerk wrote a prescient article discussing the possibility of injunctive relief and associated attorney's fees awards against judges. n96 The article also discussed the range of options that the judiciary as a whole could take to preserve their immunity. One option was to do nothing: "It is not an irresponsible position, given the continuing strength of judicial immunity . . . ." n97 Of course, Stump v. [*281] Sparkman n98 lent support for this confidence, although Pulliam proved such reliance misplaced. The judiciary also had the option of proposing a qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. n99 This option would preempt more serious and uncontrolled erosion of immunity by the courts. Alternatively, the judiciary might seek national legislation instituting qualified or absolute immunity standards. n100 If adequately drafted, such legislation would prevent the erosion of judicial immunity. Finally, "insurance coverage for liability outside the reach of judicial immunity" n101 was suggested; coverage could include indemnification against liability for acts not protected under judicial immunity in any case. n102
The judicial community did not collectively pursue any of these options (except the first) before Pulliam. After Pulliam, of course, reactions n103 were swift. The judiciary has since pursued two of the options proposed in order to restore their judicial immunity. First, the judiciary has lobbied Congress for legislation to extend judicial immunity to actions for injunctive relief and attorney's [*282] fees. Second, the judiciary sought and obtained "judicial malpractice insurance" to provide more immediate protection from their exposure to civil liability.
A. Proposed Legislation
The judiciary's concern over the loss of absolute judicial immunity was quickly impressed upon national legislators. Less than nine months after Pulliam v. Allen n104 was decided by the Supreme Court, congressional legislation was introduced to reverse its effect. n105 The objective of House Bill 877 was "[t]o prohibit the award of attorney's fees against judges growing out of actions for injunctive relief." n106 To this end, the legislation proposed amending section 1988 to disallow recovery of attorney's fees when the underlying civil rights action is brought "against a judge or other judicial officer arising out of acts done or omitted in the performance of the duties of that office . . . ." n107 Within nine months, three additional bills with the same objective had been introduced in Congress. n108
Of these initial proposals to overturn the ruling of Pulliam, Senate Bills 1794 and 1795 were the first to receive hearings. n109 The first two witnesses at these hearings were Judge Peterson, Chairman of the Committee on Judicial Immunity for the Conference of Chief Justices, n110 and Judge Dillin, representing the Judicial [*283] Conference of the United States. n111 Several other legal experts participated in these hearings to urge the expeditious passage of legislation restoring absolute judicial immunity. n112 This strong lobbying by the judiciary met with opposition from representatives of civil rights groups n113 who argued that "'[t]he only thing [that the possibility of injunctions] chills, . . . is conduct so outrageous that a [federal] district judge might enjoin it, and we want to chill that kind of conduct.'" n114 Senate Bills 1794 and 1795 did not progress beyond committee action, nor did the two similar House Bills. n115
Judicial lobbying of Congress did not subside, however, and new legislation attempting to restore judicial immunity has since been introduced in three successive Congresses. n116 In fact, the Judicial [*284] Conference of the United States and the Conference of Chief Justices proposed the wording of at least two of the bills introduced to overturn Pulliam. n117 However, none of these efforts has proceeded beyond committee consideration. n118 "[T]rying to persuade Congress has been anything but easy for the state judges, despite having the support of the policy-making organizations [*285] of the federal and state judiciary and of the American Bar Association." n119 Passing legilation to overturn Supreme Court rulings is normally a long and difficult process. Nonetheless, judicial organizations are likely to continue to press for legislation amending section 1988 until their goal of restoring absolute judicial immunity is achieved. n120
B. Judicial Malpractice Insurance
The judiciary knew that attempts to restore judicial immunity through legislation would involve at best frequent setbacks and delay, and at worst no success at all. Over six years have passed since judges were first exposed to liability for attorney's fees by Pulliam, and legislation reversing this exposure has yet to be enacted. To protect their members, various judicial organizations contacted commercial insurance companies in 1984 to request the development of judicial malpractice insurance. Insurance companies responded quickly by making professional liability insurance policies available to judges. These policies insure against attorney's fees awards as well as other sources of liability. n121
The most successful effort to procure liability insurance resulted after representatives from the Judicial Immunity Committee of the State Trial Judges Conference and from the Judicial [*286] Immunity Committee of the American Bar Association met with the National Union Fire Insurance Company ("National Union"). n122 National Union designed an insurance contract that was later adopted as a model policy of judicial liability insurance by the Conference of Chief Justices. In March 1984, the American Bar Association granted National Union "exclusive under-writing privileges through 1987." n123 Herbert L. Jamison and Company, an insurance broker and managing general agent for National Union, began marketing the policy exclusively soon after Pulliam was handed down.
Currently, National Union judicial malpractice insurance policies cover 2,496 state judges. n124 Most of these judges have bought individual policies for themselves, paying $ 800 annually n125 for a $ 2 million policy with no deductible. n126 Other judges receive the same coverage under a group policy purchased for them by their employer-state at a cost of $ 650 per judge. n127 Coverage [*287] under these policies is provided for claims arising out of "any act, error, or omission of the [judge, made in an] official judicial capacity (including but not limited to judicial, ministerial, administrative, and management acts)." n128 Thus, a judge covered by the National Union Policy is indemnified against Pulliam-type attorney's fees awards, as well as from damages arising out of hiring decisions, record-keeping mistakes, and any other job-related acts. n129 The National Union Policy further obligates the company "to defend any suit against the Insured alleging acts, errors or omissions falling within the coverage of this policy." n130 Accordingly, National Union provides coverage for all legal costs incurred in defending a lawsuit. Finally, the policy covers "all fees, costs and expenses incurred in the defense of claims made to any disciplinary committee, judicial competence committee, or any similar official committee of inquiry . . . ." n131 With limited exceptions, n132 the National Union Policy alleviates most job-related, [*288] monetary liability concerns a state judge might have. n133
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT JUDICIAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
National Union "doesn't believe in advertising its judicial malpractice coverage." n134 Consequently, most legal scholars and practitioners are unaware of this new product. A close examination of the public policies and economics behind judicial malpractice insurance has never been published. A "consumer's guide" to judicial malpractice insurance is overdue.
Deciding whether to buy judicial malpractice insurance depends on its price and the identity of the buyer. Specifically, it must be determined whether the coverage is worth the premium, and whether the states or the judges themselves should purchase the coverage.
A. The Insurance is Not Worth the Premium
Compared to malpractice insurance costs for doctors n135 and lawyers, n136 $ 800 seems inexpensive. In light of the remote potential for liability, however, the value of the coverage does not approach the cost of the premium.
1. An Analysis of Judicial Risk
Since the scope of judicial immunity does not absolutely preclude the risk of civil liability, a judge might pursue four options to manage the residual risk: "risk avoidance, risk retention, . . . [risk] control and risk transfer." n137 A judge may choose to avoid the residual risk altogether by leaving office; n138 retain the risk by personally paying any award of damages or attorney's fees; n139 control the risk by reducing the frequency or severity of loss, perhaps through legislation overturning Pulliam; n140 or transfer the risk by incurring the certain but limited expense of an insurance premium. n141
Choosing among these options requires a judge to first perform an analysis of the residual risk. Judges face six categories of risk under current judicial immunity doctrine:
1) "NonJudicial Act Peril n142 ": damage awards or settlement amounts arising from any official but nonjudicial act, such as improperly firing a court clerk;
2) "Unofficial Act Peril": damage awards or settlement amounts arising from wholly unofficial acts undertaken while on the job, such as assaulting a witness during trial;
3) "Criminal Act Peril": damage awards or settlement amounts arising from criminal acts undertaken while on the job, such as conspiring to accept bribes in return for favorable [*290] holdings;
4) "Defense Fees Peril": attorney's fees incurred to defend against both valid and spurious allegations connected with the Nonjudicial, Unofficial, and Criminal Act Perils, as well as attorney's fees still necessarily incurred to defend against easily dismissed claims stemming from an immunized judicial act;
5) "Misconduct Investigation Peril": attorney's fees incurred to defend against any claims of judicial misconduct brought by a judicial conduct review board or disciplinary commission; and,
6) "Attorney's Fees Award Peril": attorney's fees awards to plaintiffs bringing successful equitable actions under the Civil Rights Act, as in Pulliam.
An analysis of each of these perils allows an evaluation of judicial malpractice insurance. First, it is noteworthy that the first five perils all existed prior to Pulliam. Thus, a judge who chose not to engage in risk avoidance or risk transfer before Pulliam must determine whether the additional exposure of the Attorney's Fees Award Peril merits any change in risk-managing behavior. The additional exposure created by Pulliam is actually quite small -- less than one percent of lawsuits against judges result in attorney's fees awards. n143 This data suggests that the judiciary's efforts to control or transfer their risk of loss from the Attorney's Fees Award Peril, through legislation or insurance, are excessive in relation to the incremental increase in risk that the peril represents. n144
[*291] However, an examination of the aggregate risk of the six perils is necessary to determine the most effective means of risk allocation. Close examination shows that the total risk is less burdensome than it initially appears. The risk to a judge of civil liability flowing from each peril may be quantified as follows.
Defense Fees Peril. This peril represents little risk for most judges, since nearly all jurisdictions provide legal representation to judges when they are sued in their official capacities. n145 Thus, the only risk under the Defense Fees Peril would be legal defense fees incurred when a judge is sued for unofficial misconduct; that is, for alleged criminal or tortious acts committed while on the job. Non-trivial allegations of this sort of judicial behavior are unusual, n146 as one would hope. Since the vast majority of judges does not engage in the conduct that might cause such lawsuits, the Defense Fees Peril represents little risk to the typical judge.
Non Judicial Act Peril and Attorney's Fees Award Peril. These two risks have both represented little danger historically. Just as most jurisdictions provide resources to relieve judges from paying defense fees, states have indemnified their judges, even in the absence of a legal obligation, from liability for damages or [*292] attorney's fees awards arising from their official acts. n147 States have either paid for such awards against judges because of tort claims statutes or other judicial indemnification statutes, n148 or simply as a matter of unwritten policy. n149 Furthermore, it is not [*293] unusual for courts to simply find judges totally immune from liability even though the judge's act was official but not judicial. n150 Consequently, both the Nonjudicial Act Peril and the Attorney's Fees Award Peril represent virtually no risk of civil liability to the average judge.
Unofficial Act Peril, Criminal Act Peril, and Misconduct Investigation Peril. State indemnification normally does not alleviate these risks. n151 Where damages or settlement amounts for assaulting a witness or accepting a bribe are awarded against a judge, the judge will normally have to bear the cost personally. Similarly, the state is not apt to offer to pay the fees of the defense attorney for a judge who is the subject of disciplinary proceedings. n152 Therefore, the risks attending these three perils ultimately remain with the judge.
The Misconduct Investigation Peril to some extent reiterates the risk represented by the Defense Fees Peril, however, because an unsuccessful defense against allegations of criminal behavior will normally make unnecessary any misconduct investigation. More importantly, the vast majority of judges will not behave in such a way that a misconduct investigation by a disciplinary body will occur. Likewise, few judges will ever pay damages because of misconduct in office. To most judges the Unofficial Act Peril, Criminal Act Peril, and Misconduct Investigation Peril represent a fairly insignificant risk of civil liability.
[*294] Summary. Dur to judicial immunity protections and voluntary or statutory state risk absorption, the risk of civil liability retained by judges is deceptively low. This suggests that the choice of risk avoidance is inappropriate; judges managing their risk intelligently should not leave office due to fears about their exposure to civil liability. n153 This leaves the options of risk transfer and risk retention. n154 A reasonable judge might choose to insure against the risk of incurring civil liability, or instead choose to accept the risk and pay for any liability that might arise. n155 The determination depends on how the cost of judicial malpractice insurance compares with the civil liability that a typical judge incurs.
2. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Risk Transfer
The price of judicial malpractice insurance determines whether its purchase is an appropriate response to the potential for liability. An efficient price for judicial malpractice insurance directly reflects the sum of three elements: the average cost of the risk insured against, the expense involved in administering the insurance, and a reasonable profit. n156
Actual profit, cost, and expense figures from private insurance [*295] companies are not easily obtainable, but the price may be too high for National Union's coverage. The State of Ohio, for example, has purchased annually from National Union a group policy covering all of its own state judges every year since 1985. n157 In 1988, this policy covered 790 judges. n158 At the group rate of $ 650 per judge, annual premiums of $ 513,500 were paid in 1988. Therefore, Ohio paid roughly $ 2.0 million in premiums for the period of 1985 through 1988. n159 Over the same period, the total amount paid out by National Union under the Ohio group policy was $ 216,870.05, or roughly 10% of premium collected. n160 National Union placed another $ 226,593.07 in reserve for cases pending final resolution. n161 This represents a total expected loss ratio n162 of approximately twenty-two percent. Thus, National Union expects that less than twenty-five cents from every dollar [*296] received for insurance coverage will be needed to pay for claims connected with their Ohio judicial malpractice insurance group policy.
There are several possible explanations for imposing an apparently excessive premium. First, high administrative costs may inflate the insurance premium. n163 Second, the National Union Policy is unnecessarily broad in its coverage, exceeding the level of protection required to effectively bear the existing risk. n164 Third, the National Union Policy involved a novel type of insurance coverage. Initial rate-setting had to have been largely guesswork. Caution counselled excessive, not inadequate, premium leaves. n165 Fourth, the claims experience of Ohio's judges may be an aberration. One claim for a large amount could double the expected loss ratio. n166 Finally, National Union created its policy during a period of acceleration rates of lawsuits against judges. n167 Therefore, avoiding future rate increases required initially high rates. The fact remains, however, that the premiums charged by National [*297] Union to provide judicial malpractice insurance far exceed the costs associated with the risk transferred.
It should be noted that National Union responded quickly to the judiciary's requests to create an insurance policy that met certain requirements: high limits of liability, coverage for legal defense costs, and no deductible. n168 This quick response, and a willingness to insure virtually any judge who applied for the insurance, justifiably earned National Union a designation from the Conference of Chief Justices as creators of a "model policy" of judicial malpractice insurance.
After five years of experience, however, buyers of judicial malpractice insurance from National Union are justified in requesting that the company re-examine its rate structure. Judges should not expect an insurer to operate without a profit: "[i]nsurer solvency is essential for the insured . . . ." n169 Neither should judges assume judicial malpractice insurance is worthless at any [*298] price. Although most judges carrying such insurance will never make a claim, those who do find great comfort in the coverage. n170 But judges should demand that the rates charged by National Union "not be more than adequate." n171
B. States Should Not Purchase Judicial Malpractice Insurance
Separate from the quantitative question of whether judicial malpractice insurance is too expensive is the qualitative question of whether it is appropriate for the state to pay any amount for such insurance. Even if the insurance premium is actuarially valid, states must determine whether they should pay the premium or leave this to judges personally.
Unavoidably, arguments regarding state-paid indemnification reflect arguments for and against judicial immunity. Those who argue in favor of restricting the scope of judicial immunity n172 are likely to argue that judges themselves should pay for damage awards or for insurance against damage awards. Conversely, those who believe that exposure to attorney's fees awards improperly erodes judicial immunity are apt to insist that judicial immunity is best kept intact through state indemnification.
However, to advocate or reject state payment of judicial malpractice insurance premiums based solely on unsubstantiated fears of promoting judicial irresponsibility is simplistic. n173 Public policy [*299] arguments concerning state payment of judicial malpractice insurance premiums are best made in the context of each separate peril insured against by the National Union Policy. n174 Assuming that these risks are sufficient to warrant the purchase of insurance, n175 several arguments can be made in favor of and in opposition to state indemnification of the judge against each peril.
Defense Fees Peril and Misconduct Investigation Peril. Although it may be inappropriate for an insurer to pay for an insured's liability arising from certain types of behavior, courts have held that it is appropriate for an insurer to provide legal defense for an insured against the same claims. n176 Thus, while public policy may not support insurance against a judge's criminal conduct, coverage for legal defense costs against allegations of criminal behavior is not improper. Fears that the result of such insurance would be a subsidy of judicial misconduct are not well-founded.
State payment for such insurance, however, is a concern separate from the advisability of such coverage. Upon first examination, public policy seems to support state payment of the insurance costs connected with the Defense Fees and Misconduct Investigation Perils. The vast majority of lawsuits against judges, whether civil suits or investigations of misconduct initiated by disgruntled litigants, are dismissed. n177 Thus, a state's payment for its judges' defense or insurance costs protects judges from harassing litigation and prevents wasting valuable judicial time.
An argument can be made, however, that the state should absorb the Defense Fees Peril from its judges only through the use of state-appointed counsel, not state-paid insurance. Counsel provided [*300] by the insurance company will not have "the effect of providing greater state supervision over judicial conduct in state courts . . . [which] would . . . provide greater assurances that judges exercise their judicial offices with propriety." n178 Thus, employing private sector attorneys instead of state employees to defend state judges could lead to inappropriate attempts at risk control. The insurance company will be more concerned with teaching judges to avoid any conduct that might lead to a lawsuit, while the state would more properly be concerned only with teaching judges to avoid unconstitutional conduct. In sum, the use of public funds to relieve judges from the burden of defending against mostly frivolous claims may be a valid expenditure, but buying insurance is not an appropriate means of relieving this burden.
Criminal Act Peril. Wilful criminal acts are not and generally cannot be insured against. n179 Therefore, when the state pays for judicial malpractice insurance it is not insuring its judges against liability for damages arising from their criminal acts, although associated legal defense fees are covered. To the extent that judicial malpratice insurance does not insure against the Criminal Act Peril, there is no public policy argument against state payment for the insurance.
Attorney's Fees Award Peril. It has been suggested that, absent insurance, the award of attorney's fees against a judge is largely determined by the state itself. Since states defend their judges as a matter of course, n180 an attorney's fees award against a judge "would accrue only if and to the extent that the state, on behalf of the judge, decided to litigate whether the judge could constitutionally continue the challenged practice." n181 Unless a judge decided to fight an injunction despite the state's agreement with the plaintiff's position, only de minimis attorney's fees awards against judges would arise without the state's consent. If the state wrongly defended its judges' actions, fairness dictates that the state should pay for any attorney's fees awards if the plaintiff finally succeeds.
When a state pays for judicial malpractice insurance, however, the enjoined judge determines whether to fight an injunction without input from state-appointed counsel. A judge properly enjoined [*301] could, foolishly or stubbornly, decide alone to litigate a clearly unconstitutional practice, causing attorney's fees awards to mount needlessly. n182 Situations could occur where the insurance company might pay settlement costs or attorney's fees awards that far exceed the amount that the state might pay if it refused to litigate on behalf of the judge. State payment for insurance against the Attorney's Fees Award Peril thus removes an appropriate restraint against a judge's pursuit of expensive and groundless litigation.
Unofficial Act Peril. It is almost senseless to argue that the state should pay for damages arising from a judge's actions that are wholly unofficial and clearly represent misconduct. Imagine, for example, a judge who sexually harasses lawyers in the courtroom. n183 No public policy is served by using public funds to insure against liability stemming from such behavior. In fact, because protecting such behavior serves no tenable interest, insurers normally refuse coverage for such acts. n184 As such, state payment for judicial malpractice insurance might not extend to insuring against the Unofficial Act Peril; the peril is not normally insured against in any event. Like the Criminal Act Peril, then, no public [*302] policy argument against state payment for judicial malpractice insurance can be made to the extent that the insurance does not insure against the Unofficial Act Peril.
Nonjudicial Act Peril. Like criminal acts or unofficial misconduct, little justification exists for the state to pay to insure against a judge's liability for improper official acts. Racial, sexual, or religious discrimination in hiring or firing is the archetypal non-judicial act. The state can properly supply legal defense costs against this type of claim. If the claim is proved valid, however, no public policy argument supports protecting the judge from liability. n185 The existing parameters of judicial immunity allow the liability of a judge for improper official acts. n186 To hold judges personally liable for disregarding anti-discrimination policies and then to relieve them of that liability via state-paid insurance is inconsistent. Judges who are uncomfortable with exposure to this risk should pay to insure against the risk themselves.
Summary. State payment for its judges' professional liability insurance is inappropriate. By paying for judicial malpractice insurance, the state insulates its judges from liability for wrongful acts of discrimination, may in rare instances relieve judges from liability for criminal acts or acts of serious misconduct, and reduces the level of supervision over its judges. While transfer of certain risks from the judges to the state is appropriate, use of insurance as a risk-transfer mechanism produces undesirable side effects. On balance, if the state were to discontinue paying for its judges' judicial malpractice insurance, judges would remain indemnified against risks properly shouldered by the state but would no longer evade liability they properly should retain.
[*303] V. CONCLUSION
The loss of absolute judicial immunity occurred gradually through rulings that judges could be held liable for official but nonjudicial acts, and also occurred suddenly when Pulliam held state judges liable for attorney's fees awards under section 1988. n187
In the marketplace for judicial services, suppliers (judges) and consumers (accused criminals, civil litigants, and the general public) reacted to this loss of absolute judicial immunity. Consumers reacted with more lawsuits against judges. Suppliers responded by obtaining indemnification against liability and by seeking legislation to erase their liability.
Judges obtained indemnification through a new product, commonly called judicial malpractice insurance. Wise purchase of any product, especially a new one, requires a cost-benefit analysis; that is, buyers must be certain that the price is reasonable. If the insurance companies are unable to defend the rates charged, buyers should request a rate reduction or a rebate, seek another insurer, or self-insure with a clear knowledge of the total risk retained. Only through demanding information from their insurance company and acting on it, however, will buyers of this new product cause the marketplace to act efficiently.
The public should also question the use of state funds to procure insurance for the judiciary as a matter of policy, even if the price is justified. Judges buying their own malpractice insurance are acting as appropriately as doctors or lawyers who buy malpractice insurance for themselves. However, the expenditure of public funds to allow state judicial officials to escape liability for improper or ill-advised conduct is poor public policy. Moreover, it is the duty of the state to supervise its own judges. Paying the private sector to defend judges removes this supervision and may thereby damage the quality of judicial services offered.
Finally, even inefficient marketplace responses to the loss of absolute judicial immunity are preferable to restoration of absolute judicial immunity. Against the alternative of leaving individuals injured by judicial misconduct without remedy, payments for [*304] judicial malpractice insurance that are excessive or improperly shouldered by the state are still a better, and more just, solution.
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Middleton, Immunity in Question, Judges Buy Insurance, 67 A.B.A. J. 1248, 1248 (1981).
n2 See infra text accompanying notes 10-21.
n3 See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
n4 See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
n5 See infra text accompanying notes 27-95.
n6 See infra text accompanying notes 96-103.
n7 See infra text accompanying notes 104-20.
n8 See infra text accompanying notes 121-33.
n9 See infra text accompanying notes 134-86.
n10 See, e.g., Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1430-32 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (sheriff implementing a judge's orders shares absolute immunity under the doctrine of "quasi-judicial" immunity).
n11 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976) (same considerations that underlie common law immunity of judges apply to prosecutors).
n12 See, e.g., Lambert v. Garlo, 19 Ohio App. 3d 295, 299, 484 N.E.2d 260, 265 (1985) (rejecting claim that coroners do not enjoy judicial immunity when conducting investigations).
n13 See, e.g., Brown v. Charles, 309 F.Supp. 817, 817-18 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (judicial immunity extends to court reporter in cause of action for failure to provide full transcript).
n14 See, e.g., Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1981) (judicial immunity encompasses clerks and other functionaries because they are necessary for the court to fulfill its judicial duties), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840 (1982).
n15 See, e.g., White v. Hegerhorst, 418 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1969) (jurors are immune from civil action for damages), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 912 (1970).
n16 See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 67 (1880) (common law provides grand jurors immunity).
n17 See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) (witnesses enjoy common law immunity).
n18 See, e.g., Wolff v. Flanagan, No. 41746 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1980) (LEXIS) (bailiff immune from liability for damages arising from execution of a ministerial duty).
n19 See, e.g., Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (an arbitrator is a quasi-judicial officer and arbitration is encouraged by national policy, therefore the common law rule of immunity applies).
n20 Judicial immunity may also extend to mediators, referees, umpires, elected or appointed officials who preside over disputes, and support staff to these individuals. The doctrine generally applies to immunize neutral parties against liability resulting from their behavior when exhibited pursuant to their responsibility as arbiter of a dispute or administrator of justice. See N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 183 (1987) ("[N]ot only the judge, but also those performing judicial acts for the judge, are immune . . . .").
n21 A judge has been defined as "[a]n officer so named in his commission, who presides in some court; a public officer, appointed to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice . . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 841 (6th ed. 1990). The term judge is construed here to also include officials commonly called magistrates, defined as "[m]inor officials or officers with limited judicial authority; e.g. justices of the peace, judges of police courts, mayor's courts, or magistrate's courts . . . . [I]n a narrow sense [they are] regarded as . . . inferior judicial officer[s]." Id. at 857.
n22 Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity: Must Judges Be Kings in their Courts?, 64 JUDICATURE 390, 392 (1981). Judicial independence was emphasized as the reason for protecting judicial immunity to civil liability in one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions to address this issue: "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
n23 Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (1937) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original). For a criticism of the reasons behind the policy of judicial immunity listed by Jennings, see King, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liability, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 549, 579-89 (1978); Note, Immunity of Federal and State Judges From Civil Suit -- Time For a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 741-43 (1977).
n24 See Jennings, supra note 23, at 272.
n25 See, e.g., Luttner, Stokes Found Not Guilty of Dog Food Theft, The Plain Dealer, July 29, 1989, at 1A, col. 1 ("Although [Judge] Stokes acknowldeged he took the $ 17.25 bag of dog food June 2 without paying for it, he maintained throughout the two-day trail that he had intended to pay for it and thus was not guilty because he had no criminal intent."). Judge Stokes, who was acquitted, did not argue that he was insulated from prosecution under the doctrine of judicial immunity.
n26 See, e.g., Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge found civilly liable for assault and battery because he acted in a nonjudicial capacity when he "forced Gregory out the [courtroom] door, threw him to the floor in the process, jumped on him, and began to beat him."). For a definition of judicial acts performed in a judicial capacity, see infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
n27 More than a brief historical sketch of the development of the judicial immunity doctrine is beyond the scope of this note. For more detailed discussion of the history of judicial immunity, see Stafford, An Overview of Judicial Immunity, STATE CT.J., Summer 1977, at 3 (discussing the doctrine of judicial immunity as applied by state courts); Weisberger, The Twilight of Judicial Independence -- Pulliam v. Allen, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 537 (1985) (examining early American case law on judicial independence); Note, Pulliam v. Allen: Delineating the Immunity of Judges from Prospective Relief, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 829 (1985) (reviewing both the origin and purpose of the judicial immunity doctrine); Case Comment, Judges -- Malpractice? Judicial Immunity, Injunctive Relief, and Attorney's Fees under the Civil Rights Statutes, 14 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 588 (1984) (discussing the history of judicial immunity and the Supreme Court's decision in Pullman v. Allen).
n28 See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 235 (1st ed. 1924) ("as early as Edward III's reign . . . [it was held] that a litigant could not go beyond the record, in order to make judge civilly or criminal liable for an abuse of his jurisdiction.").
n29 Roth & Hagan, Tracing the Judicial Immunity Doctrine: A View From Kingly Times to the Present, STATE CT. J., Summer 1982, at 4, 4 [hereinafter Roth & Hagan, Kingly Times], reprinted in Roth & Hagan, The Judicial Immunity Doctrine Today: Between the Bench and a Hard Place, 35 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 3 (1984) [hereinafter Roth & Hagan, The Judicial Immunity Doctrine Today].
n30 Id.
n31 Weisberger, supra note 27, at 538 n.8 ("[N]ot until the Act of Settlement 12 and 13 William III (1701) [was it] that judges were given tenure independent of the King during good behavior.").
n32 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
n33 Lining v. Bentham, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 1, 3 (1796); accord Phelps v. Sill. 1 Day 315, 329 (Conn. 1804) ("[H]owever erroneous his judgment may be, . . . a judge is never liable, in any civil action, for damages arising from his mistake."); Yates v. Lansisng, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (chancellor not liable in a civil suit regarding the chancellor's habeas corpus decision), aff'd, 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1811); Brodie v. Rutledge, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 28 (1796) (a judge is liable for misdemeanors in office and is subject to impeachment for misconduct, but cannot be sued for opinions written in his judicial capacity).
n34 See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868) (considreing state common law in the absence of Supreme Court precedent).
n35 d.
n36 d. at 536.
n37 Id.
n38 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
n39 Id. at 338. The attorney defended an accused conspirator in President Lincoln's assassination. Shortly after a hung jury trail, the presiding judge issued an order restricting the attorney from appearing in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Id. at 336-37.
n40 Id. at 351.
n41 See supra text accompanying note 37.
n42 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351; see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949) (Hand, C.J.) ("[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than subject those who try to do their duty to the constant threat of retaliation."), cert. denied, U.S. 949 (1950). For a list of sources criticizing Judge Hand's position, see infra note 99.
n43 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
n44 Id. at 351-52.
n45 Id. at 352; see also, e.g., Vickrey v. Dunivan, 59 N.M. 90, 279 P.2d 853 (1055) (justice of the peace, who tried motorist under a village ordinance he knew did not exist, and who knew offense, if any, occurred outside his village, was not empowered with jurisdiction and thus was not immune).
n46 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352; see also, e.g., Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745 (Iowa 1969) (finding justice of the peace who was empowered to issue arrest warrants but did so without probable cause, for purpose of collecting unpaid checks and thereby earning a twenty percent commission, immune from a suit for damages).
n47 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
n48 Id. at 351-52. The "absence of jurisdiction" exception to judicial immunity as adopted by the Bradley Court was first proclaimed in 1612. King, supra note 23, at 570 n.158.
n49 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350. The "nonjudicial act exception" to judicial immunity adopted in Bradley was first recognized in 1589. King, supra note 23, at 576 n.223.
n50 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360-62 (1978) (enumerating factors that determine whether an act is "judicial"); infra note 52 and accompanying text.
n51 See Note, What constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1503, 1511 n.61 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Judicial Act] (analyzing various cases in which the Supreme Court's definition of a judicial act has led to holdings of judicial immunity); see also, Note, Immunity Doctrines and Employment Doctrines of Judges, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 621 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Immunity Doctrines] (discussing the inconsistency of the application of the Stump "judicial act" test" in determining whether a judge's employment decisions are "judicial" for purposes of immunity); Note, An Argument Against Judicial Immunity For Employment Decisions, 11 NOVA L. REV. 1127 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Employment Decisions] (comparing inconsistent cases involving judicial immunity with respect to employment decisions and suggesting that judges not be immune from suit for damages arising from their decisions). Compare Reheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980) (supervision of court reporters held a judicial function), cert. denied sub nom., Rheuark v. Dallas County, 450 U.S. 931 (1981) with Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1982) (appointment of judicial officers is an administrative, ministerial, or executive act, not judicial in nature).
n52 As the Supreme Court has noted, "Because [the judge] performed the type of act normally performed only by judges . . . we find no merit to respondent's argument that the informality with which he proceeded rendered his action nonjudicial and deprived him of his absolute immunity." Stump, 435 U.S. at 362-63 (1978) (emphasis added); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (6th ed. 1990) (Judicial act defined as "[a]n act by [a] member of judicial department in construing law or applying it to a particular state of facts.")
n53 Note, Judicial Act, supra note 51, at 1512.
n54 Id. at 1508 (footnotes omitted).
n55 See, e.g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) ("The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge . . . . It is merely a ministerial act . . . .").
n56 See, e.g., Clark v. Campbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Ark. 1981) ("[T]he Court is not persuaded that a County Judge, in hiring or firing county employees, is exercising a judicial function. It is clear that these duties are purely administrative and ministerial in scope."). But see Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F. Supp. 474, 477-79 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (firing a probation officer is a judicial act because a probation officer's duties are intertwined with judicial responsibility, and thus judicial immunity protects a judge from liability for monetary damages).
For the purposes of judicial immunity, the employment decisions of judges have not been recognized consistently as nonjudicial acts. See generally Note, Immunity Doctrines, supra note 51 (examines the inconsistency of decisions categorizing the same employment decision as judicial and ministerial, and concludes that the qualified immunity applicable to government executives should be applied to judicial employment decisions); Note, Judicial Act, supra note 51 (examines substantive and procedural problems arising from the Stump decision's broad definition of a judicial act); Note, Employment Decisions, supra note 51. The Supreme Court, addressing the issue for the first time, found that employment decisions are not protected by judicial immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
n57 See, e.g., Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[R]esponsibilities of recommending candidates for judicial office to the appointing officials and of reviewing reappointment petitions . . . bear little resemblance to the characteristic of the judicial process th
homer says:
March 05, 2009
07:26 PM
bluedotbama are you serious? Do you think a secret room full of semen (not the guys on the boat) is not enough? That is a fact in this case, it's why he stepped down. And I have talked to people in the black community since this story has broken and apparently many of them have long heard rumors of his drug dealing and they feel it's about time someone did something. What about the police who say they've stopped criminals driving his cars at road blocks? None of these people have anything to do with this lawyer. What about his abuse of power moving David Tomas from one jail to another, is that not fact? What would you do if you were a defense attorney with multiple clients that claim the judge in their case spanked them for lighter sentences or gave them longer ones for not complying? Isn't it his job to get to the bottom of his client's claims? I think bluedotbama is a relative of one of these people or possibly one of them him/herself. Your ability to ignore the facts of the case and only pay attention to the "criminals" testimony is typical of someone out to protect a completely incompetent or corrupt official.
Your claims of this article being written to move papers is also ridiculous, this type of paper does not have subscriptions, their circulation numbers go completely unaffected by this story causing a buzz. I'm sure it has led to move people noticing the paper, but then as you pointed out, maybe they should be, it's better than the Register and not afraid to confront corruption in our city, even when it could possibly mean confronting a man who employs drug dealers.
Unfortunately I have to agree with the Maggie, maybe not on the true legality of what he can get away with but definitely with the feeling he's going to get away with this. This is dragging out so long things are getting ruined.
bluedotbama says:
March 05, 2009
06:35 PM
I am always suspicious of someone who seems to self appoint himself and seems to know it all and have all the answers as if everybody around him is too stupid, inept or corrupt to do their jobs we elected them to. Is he really interested in the truth or is this self promotion? Perhaps law enforcement is not interested too much in his investigation or information because he brings nothing new to the table, his evidence is faulty or has already be found untrue, he is unreliable, they already have the material, etc. Time will tell. If he is right, kudos to him but if he is just a complainer who is getting in the way of a legitimate investigation he should be ashamed. I am not so willing to accept that he is the only one with any sense in this matter. He seems obsessed by this issue and obsession sometimes is a bad thing.
maggie says:
March 05, 2009
05:47 PM
bluedotbama---Can you tell the readers how and in what manner Mr. Kulakowski has it in his power to stop any investigation or is doing so now? To the contrary, he has been beating his head against the wall to assist in it and hats off to him. Looks to me like he is assisting in an investigation as he has brought many forms of evidence to local, state and federal officials. Course I may be wrong.
jim says:
March 05, 2009
04:30 PM
Here are my .02 ....
1. LE continues to look the other way until the statute of limitations expire.
2. If Thomas is innocent these are scurrilous accusations. He could sue
both the author and the paper. If he does so he will have to be deposed
under oath. It will be both interesting and telling to see which path he
chooses. Why would an innocent man choose to ignore such accusations?
maggie says:
March 05, 2009
04:29 PM
jm: I genuinely appreciate your thoughts. First of all, if you are not aware of judicial immunity covering these sorts of antics, why do you suppose Dykes et al has not been overturned and in fact has never been negatively cited in any federal circuit? I do agree that the situations in the situations in the citations I listed do not reach this level. Herman and those who helped this which had to include the chief clerk of the court at the time and her clerks who changed the dockets, as well as many many others who turned a blind eye to the situation. Unfortunately many of those (but not necessarily all) as explained in the Dykes dissent opinion performed the acts that allowed this to happen and did so in a quasi judicial position so they too enjoy judicial immunity. I totally agree that this whole situation is in a word a sick cluster f... I wonder where our Hon Senator Jeff Sessions who is very talented and member of the federal judiciary committee is? Surely he is aware of this. Perhaps Rob can interview Sen Sessions and get his thoughts. Also judicial immunity that applies to a judge does not necessarily always adhere and trickle down to an attorney so that analogy may not be a good one. Finally, Rob may want to also interview the president of the Mobile and Alabama State Bar. Where is the legal outcry about this situation? Awfully silent. They always brag that they police there own unlike the medical profession. Really. Very few attnys speaking out and on the record--afraid you might not get any more appointments? Hmmmmmmmmmm I would like Mr. Ian Gaston's and former Mobile AL Bar presidents comments on the record.
jm says:
March 05, 2009
03:58 PM
Bluedotbama: Say what? Can you even imagine what the world would be like if the mark of good journalism involved avoiding potentially insulting public officials? Wowzers!
As for the named young men, most of whom appear to have voluntarily spoken out, it is deeply troubling to even read the phrase “accused of sex acts with a judge.” These young men are not the accused and should never be treated as such. There is no such thing as consent when it comes to such a grossly disproportionate balance of power. Beyond that, many of these men were apparently CHILDREN when the alleged acts occurred. A minor facing criminal charges has zero point zero ability to properly consent to sex acts with a judge who is holding his fate in his grubby little paddling paws. These young men are the victims here, and should be applauded for their bravery.
jm says:
March 05, 2009
03:55 PM
Maggie: To my knowledge, judicial immunity, while incredibly broad, has never been stretched anywhere near covering these sorts of antics, even in a civil case. Maybe that’s because the judicial system has never seen the likes of the alleged antics of this allegedly sick MF’er. It boggles my mind to even think of an attorney trying to argue that predatory sexual abuse falls within the scope of his judicial duties. As for immunity from criminal charges, he may as well put that law in his pipe and smoke it. Or perhaps snort it.
bluedotbama says:
March 05, 2009
08:50 AM
Some seem to suggest we have corrupt or ineffective state and federal law enforcement that will do nothing and never have. From Gary Greenough and Lambert Mims all those years ago and David Thomas and Steve Russo today both entities have never hesitated to root out and prosecute corrupt politicians. Ignoring the truth for the sake of an article that simply makes bold suggestive accusations (which the Press Register apparently correctly observed) is not worthy of the publication which by the way I enjoy more than the local paper.
bluedotbama says:
March 04, 2009
02:48 PM
Like they don't make money off circulation and advertising sales.....duh.
ottograf says:
March 04, 2009
02:32 PM
This is a free newspaper.
bluedotbama says:
March 04, 2009
01:54 PM
So who appointed Mr. Kulakowski this godsend to the investigation of Mr. Thomas? Although the article can be titilating its smacks more of poor journalism in the name of selling a paper than real investigative work. It insults John Tyson Jr., Deborah Rhodes, Nicki Patterson, Ashley Rich, Vickie Davis, law enforcement and a host of others not to mention the personal embarasment some of some of these young men must face having their names plastered over the media accused of sex acts with a judge. I suggest Mr. Kulakowski get out of the way and allow the investigation to proceed and not compromise it as he potentially is doing now.
maggie says:
March 02, 2009
06:04 PM
Gotta agree with you Sweetie,
Both the investigation by Mr. Joe Kulakowski and the publication by Mr. Holbert, Ms. Trice and their staff is nothing short of heroic.
If Mr. Kulakowski is able to prosecute this case, and it may mean going all the way to the U S Supreme Court to do it sucessfully, he deserves more public asknowledgement for his efforts.
I also believe Mr. Holbert and his staff should receive an award for having the courge to go out on a limb and publish this article.
Sadly from what a law professor once said to me---if you want justice, you get that after you die; the best we have here on earth is the law with all of its frailities.
Mr. Kulakowski the public is on your side. Keep up the great work and likewise to you Mr. Holbert.
sweetie2009 says:
March 02, 2009
03:50 PM
Here's to investigating and reporting at its finest. Good job Attorney Kulakowski and Robert Holbert!
The investigating has been done, all of the evidence is in place and so are the witnesses, be they criminals or not.
Let's get this article to President Obama. I think he'll have the FBI look into it. No doubt about!!!!
maggie says:
February 27, 2009
11:06 PM
Nothing will ever happen because Mobile, not unlike New Orleans, is so impacted that nothing short of federal intervention and control will solve the problem and that appears unlikely.
I hope the hell I am wrong but in re Diana Christine DYKES, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. A.J. HOSEMANN, Jr., etc., Thomas A. Weinberg, etc., Roger Francis Dykes, Sr., etc., Roger Francis Dykes, Jr., etc., and Kenneth W. McIntosh, etc., Defendants-Appellees, No. 83-3347
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, 776 F.2d 942; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 24031, the dissenting opinion is as follows and it is still controlling.
........... HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
On the difficult issue presented in this case, the scope of judicial immunity in a [*954] suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the law in the Eleventh Circuit is now made clear. The en banc court holds that judicial immunity is complete, unqualified, and without exception. According to the majority, judicial immunity even protects a judge who acts without subject matter jurisdiction, without personal jurisdiction, and who unlawfully conspires with a party to [**35] violate another party's federal constitutional rights. As the majority concedes, no precedent, Supreme Court or otherwise, requires such a broad definition and application of the judicial immunity doctrine. Contrary to the majority's view, no policy considerations justify such a result.
More importantly, the majority's opinion implicitly repeals one third of a congressional enactment specifically designed to protect the federal constitutional rights of citizens from deprivations by state officers, including judges. In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), Congress provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. [Emphasis added.]
With the filing of the majority opinion, this important enactment for the protection of citizens of the United [**36] States may as well read: "Every person, [except a judge in Florida, Georgia and Alabama]. . . ." Judges in these former states of the confederacy will be able to deal willy nilly with the rights of citizens without having to account for willful unconstitutional actions. This important congressional enactment is amended by this opinion to apply only to state officials in the legislative and executive branches. It is another whittling away of section 1983's application. I respectfully dissent. n1
n1 This case also points up the reason citizens and legislators are increasingly demanding that lawyers and judges charged with ethical violations be judged not by other lawyers and judges under the "good ole boy" system, but by persons outside the legal profession.
To demonstrate the scope of the majority's opinion, assume that women and minorities are picketing a city council meeting to influence the city council's vote on the paving of streets and the availability of jobs in municipal government. Assume further [**37] that a judge, dissatisfied with this method of expression of a grievance, instigates a meeting with the mayor at which the judge and the mayor conspire to end the lawful demonstration. Assume also that the judge, knowingly acting without jurisdiction and with knowledge that the demonstration is lawful, causes the demonstrators to be arrested, incarcerated, held without bail, and submitted to a trial. Under this en banc opinion, no action for damages may be brought against the judge in the Eleventh Circuit. n2
n2 Bear in mind that under Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983), a court clerk issuing an arrest warrant is acting in a judicial capacity and entitled to absolute immunity. With this opinion, the en banc court places the constitutional rights of every citizen in this circuit at the mercy of any person acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. I can only hope that the court will limit the reach of the absolute immunity it now accords judges to the level of a general jurisdiction court and not extend it to clerical workers.
[**38]
If the judicial action inflicts the intended damage by killing the demonstrators' political momentum, making injunctive relief useless, the victims will lack any remedy for the violation of their rights. In a state with a political climate which is hostile to freedom of association, a judge could repeatedly interfere with constitutional rights without being held accountable. This hypothetical may seem far fetched, but it is not; this is the exact fact pattern that section 1983 was enacted to address and which it has addressed since its enactment.
It is difficult to understand how every person in the United States may be held accountable in damages for conspiring to [*955] violate another person's federal constitutional rights, except those persons trained in constitutional guarantees, charged with interpreting the constitution, and oath bound to deal fairly with parties to litigation.
Dykes v. Hosemann , 783 F.2d 1000, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 37310 (11th Cir. Fla. 1986)
No negative subsequent appellate history.
Citing References:
Citing Decisions: Citing decisions with no analysis assigned (13)
PRIOR HISTORY ( 3 citing references ) Hide Prior History
1. Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17818 (11th Cir. Fla. 1984)
2. Rehearing, en banc, granted by:
Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 15835 (11th Cir. Fla. 1984)
3. On rehearing at, En banc, Remanded by:
Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 24031 (11th Cir. Fla. 1985)
On remand at (CITATION YOU ENTERED):
Dykes v. Hosemann, 783 F.2d 1000, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 37310 (11th Cir. Fla. 1986)
SUBSEQUENT APPELLATE HISTORY ( 1 citing reference ) Show Subsequent Appellate History
---------------------------------------------------------------------
CITING DECISIONS ( 13 citing decisions )
2ND CIRCUIT - COURT OF APPEALS
5. Cited by:
Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8680 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1998)
143 F.3d 105 p.114
7TH CIRCUIT - U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
6. Cited by:
Miller v. Duffin, 637 F. Supp. 496, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25783 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
637 F. Supp. 496 p.500
11TH CIRCUIT - COURT OF APPEALS
7. Cited by:
Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14292, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 302 (11th Cir. Ga. 1994)
21 F.3d 1544 p.1557
8. Cited by:
Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14321 (11th Cir. Ga. 1990)
909 F.2d 463 p.469
9. Cited by:
Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12014 (11th Cir. Ala. 1988)
854 F.2d 421 p.425
10. Cited by:
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 7981, 8 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1 (11th Cir. Ga. 1987)
819 F.2d 1551 p.1562
11TH CIRCUIT - U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
11. Cited by:
Igo v. Howard, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12223 (S.D. Ala. June 6, 1994)
12. Cited by:
Cummings v. Persons, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9662 (S.D. Ala. May 16, 1994)
13. Cited by:
Champion v. Hunt, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7840 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 1992)
14. Cited by:
Martin v. Avery, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16041 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 31, 1991)
15. Cited by:
Davis v. Hill, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16077 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1991)
16. Cited by:
Watts v. Mashburn, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6187 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 1991)
17. Cited by:
Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 707 F. Supp. 1318, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1795 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
707 F. Supp. 1318 p.1327
paymenow says:
February 26, 2009
04:20 PM
Looks like it is in the hands of Tyson now. If his hands are clean. Guess we will know by how this is or is not handled.
Which leads to the question of how do you get this case to be opened for prosecution?
Is there anyone in Mobile who won't go down if they bring this up?
paymenow says:
February 26, 2009
04:19 PM
Looks like it is in the hands of Tyson now. If his hands are clean. Guess we will know by how this is or is not handled.
Which leads to the question of how do you get this case to be opened for prosecution?
Is there anyone in Mobile who won't go down if they bring this up?
the82ndman says:
February 25, 2009
09:00 PM
What does the past & current mayor know and when did they know it? Where is the F.B.I.? "It's the seriousness of the charge."
homer says:
February 25, 2009
03:16 PM
This is local politics at it's finest. I don't think term limits will do anything to stop corruption, there is a never ending line of morally corrupt individuals ready to step in and be just as corrupt. People need to stop re-electing sneaky politicians. If there's smoke there's probably a freaking entire city on fire in the background when it comes to politics. And it's not just the black community, there are plenty of white people involved I'm sure, although I think we can pretty much count that Kappa Alpha Psi on a resume to be an indicator.
What needs to be done is for each and every one of us to look at every elected official in this story and do what they did, turn away (on election day). Put someone else in office and be more selective. If public officials started loosing their jobs because of the behavior of other public officials maybe they wouldn't be so willing to close their eyes.
From what I understand Sam Jones behaves just like these people. Why isn't anyone stepping up against Sam Jones? For all we know he could be waist deep in this mess, not that he would comment on it.
funkmeister says:
February 25, 2009
12:20 PM
seems the death of the 15 y.o. is a bit fishy.
It is proven once again that lifetime politicians/judges tend to give in to the temptations of money, power, and in this case young black males over the course of their careers.
I feel term limits for all judges and politicians is the only way to solve corrupt government.
great article joe and rob keep up the work of the people!
zzmobile says:
February 25, 2009
08:23 AM
Everyone involved should be indicted for their involvement. It's absolutely incredible that the DA's office could be so interwoven in this as well as the Mobile County Jail. Which involves the Sheriff's Office and the Grand Jury which review conditions at the jail on a regular basis. The Sheriff's Office runs the jail and are aware of all prisoners travel in and out. This is a system wide failure that should be handled at a Federal level.
Rob Holbert: you are performing a service to the community that should be lauded by all. THANKS!
Joe Kulakowski: Thanks, for having the fortitude to bring this to the attention of the common man, which suspected corruption from day one.